chore(release): prepare v0.1.3

Merge the independently reviewed v0.1.3 release preparation.
[verified] chore(release): prepare v0.1.3
2026-10-04 07:34:51 +00:00 · 2026-10-04 16:32:23 +09:00 · 2026-10-04 07:13:11 +00:00 · 2026-10-04 03:56:53 +00:00 · 2026-10-04 03:53:47 +00:00 · 2026-10-03 00:17:44 +00:00
34 changed files with 3404 additions and 179 deletions
@@ -1,2 +1,9 @@
 # Optional. Defaults to ~/.local/share/jarca/ledger.sqlite3
 JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH=
+
+# Required for the Streamlit Dashboard. Inject real values from a secret store.
+JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID=
+JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD=
+JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET=
+# Optional Uvicorn proxy trust allowlist. Keep loopback unless a reviewed HTTPS proxy is used.
+JARCA_DASHBOARD_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=127.0.0.1
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+schema: gitea-agent/release/v1
+
+version:
+  sources:
+    - path: pyproject.toml
+      format: toml
+      selector: project.version
+    - path: jarca_ledger_mcp/__init__.py
+      format: python-assignment
+      selector: __version__
+  lockfiles:
+    - path: uv.lock
+      package: jarca-ledger-mcp
+  tag_template: "v{version}"
+
+prepare:
+  runtime:
+    python: "3.12"
+  commands:
+    - name: sync
+      argv: [uv, sync, --python, "3.12", --frozen, --extra, dev, --extra, dashboard]
+    - name: lint
+      argv: [uv, run, ruff, check, .]
+    - name: test
+      argv: [uv, run, pytest]
+    - name: dashboard-http-smoke
+      argv: [uv, run, python, scripts/ci_dashboard_http_smoke.py, --host, 127.0.0.1, --port, "18501", --timeout, "45"]
+    - name: db-safety-smoke
+      argv: [uv, run, python, scripts/ci_db_safety_smoke.py, --timeout, "45"]
+
+artifacts:
+  - type: container
+    name: jarca-ledger-mcp
+    platform: linux/arm64
+
+    build:
+      adapter: docker-buildx
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: Dockerfile
+      pull: true
+      local_tag_template: "jarca-ledger-mcp:release-{commit}"
+      labels:
+        org.opencontainers.image.source: "https://gitea.jsfamily.quest/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp"
+        org.opencontainers.image.revision: "{commit}"
+        org.opencontainers.image.version: "{version}"
+
+    smoke:
+      - type: image-platform
+        expected_os: linux
+        expected_architecture: arm64
+      - type: container-command
+        environment:
+          JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH: /data/ledger.sqlite3
+        argv:
+          - python
+          - -c
+          - >-
+            import os, pathlib, platform; from jarca_ledger_mcp import service;
+            assert os.getuid() == 1000, os.getuid();
+            assert os.getgid() == 1000, os.getgid();
+            probe = pathlib.Path("/data/.write-probe");
+            probe.write_text("ok"); probe.unlink();
+            result = service.health_check();
+            assert platform.machine() == "aarch64";
+            assert pathlib.Path("/data/ledger.sqlite3").is_file();
+            assert result["success"], result
+      - type: container-health
+        name_template: "jarca-mcp-{run_id}"
+        command: default
+        expected: healthy
+        timeout_seconds: 90
+      - type: container-http
+        name_template: "jarca-dashboard-{run_id}"
+        command:
+          - uvicorn
+          - dashboard.server:app
+          - --host
+          - 0.0.0.0
+          - --port
+          - "8501"
+          - --proxy-headers
+        container_port: 8501
+        path: /_stcore/health
+        expected_status: 200
+        expected_body: ok
+        timeout_seconds: 90
+
+    publish:
+      adapter: gitea-container-registry
+      registry: gitea.jsfamily.quest
+      repository: jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp
+      credentials:
+        username: authenticated-gitea-login
+        token_env: GITEA_TOKEN
+      tags:
+        - "{tag}"
+        - "sha-{commit}"
+      overwrite: false
+      verify:
+        - digest
+        - platform
+        - org.opencontainers.image.revision
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-name: Verify and publish ARM64 image
-
-on:
-  pull_request:
-    paths:
-      - Dockerfile
-      - .dockerignore
-      - pyproject.toml
-      - uv.lock
-      - jarca_ledger_mcp/**
-      - dashboard/**
-      - .github/workflows/publish-image.yml
-  push:
-    tags:
-      - "v*"
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-concurrency:
-  group: image-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
-
-jobs:
-  verify-arm64:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-        with:
-          platforms: arm64
-
-      - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-
-      - name: Build ARM64 verification image
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          context: .
-          platforms: linux/arm64
-          load: true
-          push: false
-          tags: jarca-ledger-mcp:arm64-verify
-          cache-from: type=gha,scope=jarca-ledger-arm64
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=jarca-ledger-arm64
-
-      - name: Verify image platform, imports, and SQLite
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          test "$(docker image inspect jarca-ledger-mcp:arm64-verify --format '{{.Architecture}}')" = arm64
-          docker run --rm --platform linux/arm64 \
-            -e JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH=/tmp/ledger.sqlite3 \
-            jarca-ledger-mcp:arm64-verify \
-            python -c 'import platform, cryptography, numpy, pandas, pyarrow, pymupdf; from jarca_ledger_mcp import service; result=service.health_check(); assert platform.machine() == "aarch64"; assert result["success"], result; print(result["schema_version"])'
-
-      - name: Verify MCP and Dashboard startup
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          trap 'docker rm -f jarca-mcp-smoke jarca-dashboard-smoke >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
-
-          docker run -d --name jarca-mcp-smoke --platform linux/arm64 \
-            jarca-ledger-mcp:arm64-verify
-          for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
-            status=$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' jarca-mcp-smoke)
-            test "$status" = healthy && break
-            test "$status" = unhealthy && { docker logs jarca-mcp-smoke; exit 1; }
-            sleep 1
-          done
-          test "$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' jarca-mcp-smoke)" = healthy
-
-          docker run -d --name jarca-dashboard-smoke --platform linux/arm64 \
-            -p 127.0.0.1::8501 jarca-ledger-mcp:arm64-verify \
-            python -m streamlit run dashboard/app.py \
-            --server.address 0.0.0.0 --server.port 8501 \
-            --server.headless true --browser.gatherUsageStats false
-          port=$(docker port jarca-dashboard-smoke 8501/tcp | sed 's/.*://')
-          code=000
-          for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
-            code=$(curl -sS -o /tmp/dashboard-health -w '%{http_code}' \
-              "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/_stcore/health" || true)
-            test "$code" = 200 && break
-            sleep 1
-          done
-          test "$code" = 200
-          test "$(tr -d '\n' < /tmp/dashboard-health)" = ok
-
-  publish:
-    if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
-    needs: verify-arm64
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      packages: write
-    outputs:
-      digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-        with:
-          platforms: arm64
-
-      - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-
-      - name: Log in to GHCR
-        uses: docker/login-action@v3
-        with:
-          registry: ghcr.io
-          username: ${{ github.actor }}
-          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-
-      - name: Build and publish immutable ARM64 image
-        id: build
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          context: .
-          platforms: linux/arm64
-          push: true
-          tags: |
-            ghcr.io/genichin/jarca-ledger-mcp:${{ github.ref_name }}
-            ghcr.io/genichin/jarca-ledger-mcp:sha-${{ github.sha }}
-          labels: |
-            org.opencontainers.image.source=${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}
-            org.opencontainers.image.revision=${{ github.sha }}
-            org.opencontainers.image.version=${{ github.ref_name }}
-          cache-from: type=gha,scope=jarca-ledger-arm64
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=jarca-ledger-arm64
-          provenance: mode=max
-          sbom: true
-
-      - name: Report published digest
-        run: |
-          echo "ghcr.io/genichin/jarca-ledger-mcp:${GITHUB_REF_NAME}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}"
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
    JARCA_MCP_HOST=0.0.0.0 \
    JARCA_MCP_PORT=8000 \
    JARCA_MCP_STREAMABLE_HTTP_PATH=/mcp \
+    HOME=/home/jarca \
+    TMPDIR=/tmp \
    PATH=/app/.venv/bin:$PATH

 COPY --from=uv /uv /uvx /usr/local/bin/
@@ -20,9 +22,15 @@ WORKDIR /app
 COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock README.md ./
 RUN uv sync --frozen --no-dev --extra dashboard --no-install-project

-COPY jarca_ledger_mcp ./jarca_ledger_mcp
-COPY dashboard ./dashboard
-RUN uv sync --frozen --no-dev --extra dashboard
+RUN groupadd --gid 1000 jarca \
+    && useradd --uid 1000 --gid 1000 --create-home --home-dir /home/jarca --shell /usr/sbin/nologin jarca \
+    && chown -R 1000:1000 /home/jarca \
+    && install -d -o 1000 -g 1000 -m 0770 /data
+
+COPY --chown=1000:1000 jarca_ledger_mcp ./jarca_ledger_mcp
+COPY --chown=1000:1000 dashboard ./dashboard
+RUN uv sync --frozen --no-dev --extra dashboard \
+    && chmod -R a+rX /app

 VOLUME ["/data"]
 EXPOSE 8000 8501
@@ -30,4 +38,6 @@ EXPOSE 8000 8501
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=20s --retries=3 \
    CMD python -c "import os, socket; s=socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1', int(os.getenv('JARCA_MCP_PORT', '8000'))), timeout=3); s.close()"

+USER 1000:1000
+
 CMD ["jarca-ledger-mcp"]
@@ -31,12 +31,28 @@ hermes mcp test jarca-ledger

 로컬 웹 대시보드는 실제 기본 DB `~/.local/share/jarca/ledger.sqlite3`를 읽고 씁니다.

+Dashboard는 모든 조회·수정·Import 기능 앞에서 단일 관리자 로그인을 요구합니다. 관리자 ID, password와 독립적인 서명 secret은 Streamlit secrets가 아니라 배포 secret이 주입하는 다음 환경변수에서만 읽습니다.
+
+```bash
+export JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID='<secret store에서 주입>'
+export JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD='<secret store에서 주입>'
+export JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET='<32 byte 이상의 무작위 secret을 주입>'
+```
+
+세 값 중 하나라도 누락됐거나 비어 있거나 읽을 수 없으면 Dashboard는 fail-closed하여 로그인 설정 오류만 표시하고 DB나 page view에 접근하지 않습니다. 서명 secret은 32 byte 이상이어야 합니다. 실제 credential이나 서명 secret을 `.env`, Compose 파일, shell history 또는 repository 문서에 저장하지 마세요.
+
 ```bash
 cd /root/projects/jarca-ledger-mcp
 . .venv/bin/activate
-streamlit run dashboard/app.py --server.address 0.0.0.0 --server.port 8501
+uvicorn dashboard.server:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8501
 ```

+인증 성공 시 Dashboard의 동일 ASGI 프로세스에 포함된 server-side 인증 endpoint가 `__Host-jarca_dashboard_auth` cookie를 발급합니다. Cookie는 `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, `Path=/`, no `Domain`이며 token의 `sub`는 관리자 ID가 아닌 비민감 고정 role `dashboard-admin`입니다. 기본 절대 만료는 24시간이며 `로그인 상태 유지 (30일)`을 선택하면 30일입니다. 일반 요청이나 재접속은 만료를 연장하지 않습니다. 관리자 ID, password 또는 서명 secret을 교체하면 현재 설정에 묶인 서명 검증이 실패합니다. malformed·expired·tampered·rotation-invalid 또는 configuration-failure cookie는 보호 자원 전에 거부되고 same-origin `/api/auth/cleanup`에서 matching deletion 후 미인증 상태로 전이합니다. `로그아웃`도 browser cookie를 삭제하지만 stateless token을 서버에서 개별 폐기하지 않으므로 사고 대응 시 credential 또는 서명 secret을 교체해야 합니다.
+
+`Secure` cookie를 사용하므로 browser가 접근하는 공개 origin은 HTTPS여야 하며 login/logout endpoint는 ASGI request scheme도 HTTPS가 아니면 거부합니다. Login과 logout은 same-origin HTTPS POST만 허용하고 cleanup GET은 same-origin HTTPS `Referer`를 검증합니다. TLS를 Ingress 또는 reverse proxy에서 종료할 때는 `JARCA_DASHBOARD_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`를 실제 proxy source IP/CIDR allowlist로 설정해야 합니다. 기본값 `127.0.0.1`은 cluster ingress를 신뢰하지 않는 fail-closed 값입니다. `*` 또는 불특정 network를 신뢰하지 말고 proxy가 `Host`, `Origin`, `Referer`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`를 정확히 보존·설정하게 하세요. 인증 cookie의 발급·검증은 Dashboard 프로세스가 직접 수행합니다. 잘못된 ID 또는 password 응답은 매 제출마다 최소 1초 지연되지만 애플리케이션 잠금은 없습니다. 이 지연은 병렬 요청으로 우회할 수 있으므로 외부 노출 경계에 별도 rate limiting을 적용해야 합니다.
+
+이 로그인은 **Streamlit Dashboard만 보호하며 MCP endpoint를 인증하지 않습니다.** MCP는 별도 요구사항과 적절한 네트워크 경계로 보호해야 합니다.
+
 주요 화면:

 - 요약: 실제 수입/지출과 계좌 입출금을 분리 표시, 월별 현금흐름, 지출 카테고리 차트
@@ -62,7 +78,7 @@ Deployment: jarca-ledger (replicas: 1)
   │  └─ containerPort: 8000
   ├─ frontend container
   │  ├─ 동일 릴리즈 이미지
-   │  ├─ command: python -m streamlit run dashboard/app.py ...
+   │  ├─ command: uvicorn dashboard.server:app ...
   │  └─ containerPort: 8501
   └─ shared PVC
      └─ /data/ledger.sqlite3
@@ -72,15 +88,19 @@ Deployment: jarca-ledger (replicas: 1)

 - 하나의 Pod 안에서 MCP와 Streamlit을 **별도 컨테이너**로 실행합니다. 한 컨테이너에서 두 프로세스를 supervisor나 background command로 함께 실행하지 않습니다.
 - 두 컨테이너는 동일한 PVC를 `/data`에 마운트하고 `JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH=/data/ledger.sqlite3`를 사용합니다.
- SQLite 파일을 공유하므로 Deployment의 replica는 `1`로 유지합니다.
- MCP와 frontend는 목적별 Kubernetes Service로 분리합니다. MCP는 `8000`, frontend는 `8501`을 대상으로 합니다.
- 외부 공개가 필요하면 일반적으로 frontend Service만 Ingress 또는 NodePort에 연결하고, MCP Service는 필요한 범위에서만 노출합니다.
+- 이미지와 Pod는 UID/GID `1000:1000`으로 실행하며, PVC 쓰기 권한은 `fsGroup: 1000`으로 설정합니다.
+- frontend 컨테이너에만 `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID`, `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, `JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET`을 Kubernetes Secret 또는 동등한 secret store에서 주입합니다. 실제 값은 manifest나 repository에 기록하지 않습니다.
+- SQLite 파일을 공유하므로 Deployment의 replica는 `1`, update 전략은 `Recreate`로 유지합니다.
+- Base는 Dashboard용 `ClusterIP` Service(`8501`)만 생성합니다. 인증 계층이 없는 MCP port `8000`에는 Service를 만들지 않고 `NetworkPolicy`로 ingress를 차단합니다. MCP 원격 접근이 필요하면 environment overlay에서 인증된 gateway와 제한된 ingress 정책을 함께 정의합니다.
+- 외부 공개가 필요하면 Dashboard Service만 environment overlay의 Ingress 또는 NodePort에 연결합니다.
 - ARM64 worker에서만 실행하도록 Pod의 `nodeSelector` 또는 node affinity를 설정합니다.
- 배포 이미지는 가변 태그 대신 검증된 GHCR digest로 고정합니다.
+- 배포 이미지는 가변 태그 대신 검증된 `gitea.jsfamily.quest/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp` Gitea Container Registry digest로 고정합니다.
+
+검증된 k3s Kustomize base는 [`deploy/k8s/base`](deploy/k8s/base)에 있으며, Secret 준비·digest pinning·배포 절차는 [`deploy/k8s/README.md`](deploy/k8s/README.md)를 따릅니다. Base에는 실제 Secret, Ingress, TLS와 cluster별 설정을 포함하지 않습니다.

 Streamlit이 SQLite에 직접 접근하지 않고 MCP/API만 호출하도록 변경하거나 네트워크 DB로 전환한 뒤에는 MCP와 frontend를 각각 독립 Deployment로 분리할 수 있습니다.

-로컬 `docker-compose.yml`도 동일한 애플리케이션 이미지를 두 컨테이너로 실행하는 구조입니다. 현재 Compose 설정은 로컬에서 빌드한 `jarca-ledger:latest`를 사용하며, MCP는 호스트 `8000` 포트로, Streamlit은 호스트 `40059`에서 컨테이너 `8501` 포트로 연결됩니다. GHCR 릴리즈를 배포할 때는 두 서비스의 `image`를 검증된 동일 digest로 지정해야 합니다.
+로컬 `docker-compose.yml`도 동일한 애플리케이션 이미지를 두 컨테이너로 실행하는 구조입니다. 현재 Compose 설정은 로컬에서 빌드한 `jarca-ledger:latest`를 사용하며, MCP는 호스트 `8000` 포트로, Dashboard는 호스트 `40059`에서 컨테이너 `8501` 포트로 연결됩니다. Compose 실행 전 host environment 또는 안전한 `.env` 전달 경계에 세 Dashboard 인증 변수를 설정해야 하며 누락 시 Compose가 시작을 거부합니다. Browser 접근에는 HTTPS reverse proxy를 앞에 두어야 합니다. Bind mount 대상 `/volume1/docker/jarca-ledger/data`는 UID/GID `1000:1000`이 쓸 수 있어야 합니다. Gitea Container Registry 릴리즈를 배포할 때는 두 서비스의 `image`를 검증된 동일 `gitea.jsfamily.quest/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp` digest로 지정해야 합니다.

 ## 주요 도구

@@ -109,4 +129,4 @@ Streamlit이 SQLite에 직접 접근하지 않고 MCP/API만 호출하도록 변
 - 국민은행 PDF import는 암호화 PDF 비밀번호를 입력받아 PyMuPDF로 표를 추출하고, `transaction_datetime`, `counterparty`, `balance_after`, `branch`, `raw_summary`, `raw_payload`에 원본 세부 정보를 보존합니다.
 - CSV/PDF/API import는 `import_batches`에 묶음 이력을 남기고, 잘못 가져온 batch는 `rollback_ledger_import_batch`로 되돌릴 수 있습니다.
 - 카테고리에는 `cashflow_kind`를 저장해 실제 가계부 수입/지출(`income`, `expense`)과 계좌이체/투자이동/분석제외(`transfer`, `investment`, `exclude`, `debt_payment`, `unknown`)를 분리합니다.
- CSV import는 먼저 preview 후 저장하는 흐름으로 확장합니다.
+- CSV import는 먼저 preview 후 저장하는 흐름으로 확장합니다.
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ if __package__ in (None, ""):
 st.set_page_config(page_title="Jarca Ledger", page_icon="💰", layout="wide")

 from dashboard.common import clear_cache, get_db_path, get_transfer_review_items, inject_app_css, render_sidebar_nav  # noqa: F401
+from dashboard.authentication import require_dashboard_authentication
 from dashboard.page_views.accounts import page_accounts
 from dashboard.page_views.assets import page_assets
 from dashboard.page_views.categories import page_categories
@@ -25,6 +26,9 @@ from dashboard.page_views.transactions import page_transactions
 from dashboard.page_views.uncategorized import page_uncategorized

 def main() -> None:
+    if not require_dashboard_authentication():
+        return
+
    db_path = get_db_path()
    inject_app_css()
    pages = ["월정산", "요약", "자산/마감", "거래내역", "확인필요 큐", "미분류", "분류 규칙", "카테고리", "계좌", "Import"]
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import secrets
+import time
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit
+
+from starlette.requests import Request
+from starlette.responses import PlainTextResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
+from starlette.routing import Route
+
+from dashboard import authentication
+
+_MAX_LOGIN_BODY_BYTES = 4096
+_MAX_CREDENTIAL_CHARS = 1024
+
+
+def _redirect(location: str) -> RedirectResponse:
+    response = RedirectResponse(location, status_code=303)
+    response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store"
+    response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
+    return response
+
+
+def _same_origin(request: Request) -> bool:
+    origin = request.headers.get("origin")
+    host = request.headers.get("host")
+    if not origin or not host:
+        return False
+    try:
+        parsed = urlsplit(origin)
+        authority = urlsplit(f"//{host}")
+        origin_port = parsed.port or 443
+        request_port = authority.port or 443
+        return (
+            request.url.scheme == "https"
+            and parsed.scheme == "https"
+            and parsed.hostname is not None
+            and authority.hostname is not None
+            and parsed.hostname.lower() == authority.hostname.lower()
+            and origin_port == request_port
+            and parsed.username is None
+            and parsed.password is None
+            and parsed.path in {"", "/"}
+            and not parsed.query
+            and not parsed.fragment
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _same_origin_navigation(request: Request) -> bool:
+    referer = request.headers.get("referer")
+    host = request.headers.get("host")
+    if not referer or not host:
+        return False
+    try:
+        parsed = urlsplit(referer)
+        authority = urlsplit(f"//{host}")
+        referer_port = parsed.port or 443
+        request_port = authority.port or 443
+        return (
+            request.url.scheme == "https"
+            and parsed.scheme == "https"
+            and parsed.hostname is not None
+            and authority.hostname is not None
+            and parsed.hostname.lower() == authority.hostname.lower()
+            and referer_port == request_port
+            and parsed.username is None
+            and parsed.password is None
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _one(values: dict[str, list[str]], name: str) -> str | None:
+    candidates = values.get(name)
+    if candidates is None or len(candidates) != 1:
+        return None
+    value = candidates[0]
+    if len(value) > _MAX_CREDENTIAL_CHARS:
+        return None
+    return value
+
+
+async def login(request: Request) -> Response:
+    correlation_id = secrets.token_hex(8)
+    if not _same_origin(request):
+        authentication.log_auth_event("login_origin_rejected", correlation_id)
+        return PlainTextResponse("Forbidden", status_code=403)
+    content_type = request.headers.get("content-type", "").split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower()
+    if content_type != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded":
+        authentication.log_auth_event("login_request_rejected", correlation_id)
+        return PlainTextResponse("Bad Request", status_code=400)
+    body = bytearray()
+    async for chunk in request.stream():
+        if len(body) + len(chunk) > _MAX_LOGIN_BODY_BYTES:
+            authentication.log_auth_event("login_request_rejected", correlation_id)
+            return PlainTextResponse("Bad Request", status_code=400)
+        body.extend(chunk)
+    try:
+        values = parse_qs(
+            bytes(body).decode("utf-8"),
+            keep_blank_values=True,
+            strict_parsing=True,
+            max_num_fields=3,
+            encoding="utf-8",
+            errors="strict",
+        )
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        authentication.log_auth_event("login_request_rejected", correlation_id)
+        return PlainTextResponse("Bad Request", status_code=400)
+
+    settings = authentication.load_auth_settings()
+    if settings is None:
+        authentication.log_auth_event("configuration_error", correlation_id)
+        return _redirect("/?auth_error=unavailable")
+
+    submitted_id = _one(values, "admin_id")
+    submitted_password = _one(values, "admin_password")
+    if submitted_id is None or submitted_password is None:
+        authentication.log_auth_event("login_request_rejected", correlation_id)
+        return _redirect("/?auth_error=invalid")
+
+    started_at = time.monotonic()
+    if not authentication.verify_credentials(
+        settings.credentials, submitted_id, submitted_password
+    ):
+        await asyncio.to_thread(
+            authentication.enforce_failed_login_delay, started_at=started_at
+        )
+        authentication.log_auth_event("login_failed", correlation_id)
+        return _redirect("/?auth_error=invalid")
+
+    remember_me = _one(values, "remember_me") == "on"
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings,
+        remember_me=remember_me,
+    )
+    response = _redirect("/")
+    response.set_cookie(
+        authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME,
+        issued.value,
+        max_age=issued.max_age,
+        path="/",
+        secure=True,
+        httponly=True,
+        samesite="lax",
+    )
+    authentication.log_auth_event("login_succeeded", correlation_id)
+    return response
+
+
+async def logout(request: Request) -> Response:
+    correlation_id = secrets.token_hex(8)
+    if not _same_origin(request):
+        authentication.log_auth_event("logout_origin_rejected", correlation_id)
+        return PlainTextResponse("Forbidden", status_code=403)
+    response = _redirect("/")
+    _delete_auth_cookie(response)
+    authentication.log_auth_event("logout", correlation_id)
+    return response
+
+
+def _delete_auth_cookie(response: Response) -> None:
+    response.delete_cookie(
+        authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME,
+        path="/",
+        secure=True,
+        httponly=True,
+        samesite="lax",
+    )
+
+
+async def cleanup(request: Request) -> Response:
+    correlation_id = secrets.token_hex(8)
+    if not _same_origin_navigation(request):
+        authentication.log_auth_event("cleanup_origin_rejected", correlation_id)
+        return PlainTextResponse("Forbidden", status_code=403)
+    response = _redirect("/")
+    _delete_auth_cookie(response)
+    authentication.log_auth_event("cleanup", correlation_id)
+    return response
+
+
+def create_auth_routes() -> list[Route]:
+    return [
+        Route("/api/auth/login", login, methods=["POST"]),
+        Route("/api/auth/logout", logout, methods=["POST"]),
+        Route("/api/auth/cleanup", cleanup, methods=["GET"]),
+    ]
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Callable as CallableABC, Mapping, MutableMapping
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import logging
+import os
+import secrets
+import time
+from typing import Callable
+
+from itsdangerous import BadData, URLSafeSerializer
+import streamlit as st
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+ADMIN_ID_ENV = "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV = "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD"
+SIGNING_SECRET_ENV = "JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET"
+CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE = "관리자 인증 설정을 확인할 수 없습니다."
+INVALID_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE = "관리자 ID 또는 비밀번호가 올바르지 않습니다."
+MINIMUM_FAILURE_DELAY_SECONDS = 1.0
+AUTH_CORRELATION_SESSION_KEY = "_jarca_dashboard_auth_correlation_id"
+AUTH_COOKIE_NAME = "__Host-jarca_dashboard_auth"
+DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
+REMEMBER_ME_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60
+MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH = 4096
+CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30
+_TOKEN_VERSION = 1
+_TOKEN_SALT = "jarca-dashboard-persistent-auth-v1"
+_TOKEN_CONTEXT = b"jarca-dashboard-persistent-auth-v1\x00"
+_TOKEN_FIELDS = frozenset({"v", "sub", "iat", "exp", "jti"})
+_TOKEN_SUBJECT = "dashboard-admin"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AdminCredentials:
+    admin_id: str
+    password: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthSettings:
+    admin_id: str
+    admin_password: str
+    signing_secret: str
+
+    @property
+    def credentials(self) -> AdminCredentials:
+        return AdminCredentials(admin_id=self.admin_id, password=self.admin_password)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class IssuedPersistentToken:
+    value: str
+    issued_at: int
+    expires_at: int
+    max_age: int
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class VerifiedPersistentToken:
+    subject: str
+    issued_at: int
+    expires_at: int
+    token_id: str
+
+
+class AuthenticationConfigurationError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised without secret details when dashboard authentication is unavailable."""
+
+
+def _read_required_setting(source: Mapping[str, str], name: str) -> str:
+    try:
+        value = source.get(name)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise AuthenticationConfigurationError(CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE) from exc
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        raise AuthenticationConfigurationError(CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE)
+    return value
+
+
+def load_admin_credentials(environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> AdminCredentials:
+    source = os.environ if environ is None else environ
+    return AdminCredentials(
+        admin_id=_read_required_setting(source, ADMIN_ID_ENV),
+        password=_read_required_setting(source, ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV),
+    )
+
+
+def require_auth_settings(environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> AuthSettings:
+    source = os.environ if environ is None else environ
+    settings = AuthSettings(
+        admin_id=_read_required_setting(source, ADMIN_ID_ENV),
+        admin_password=_read_required_setting(source, ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV),
+        signing_secret=_read_required_setting(source, SIGNING_SECRET_ENV),
+    )
+    if len(settings.signing_secret.encode("utf-8")) < 32:
+        raise AuthenticationConfigurationError(CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE)
+    return settings
+
+
+def load_auth_settings(environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> AuthSettings | None:
+    try:
+        return require_auth_settings(environ)
+    except AuthenticationConfigurationError:
+        return None
+
+
+def verify_credentials(
+    credentials: AdminCredentials, submitted_id: str, submitted_password: str
+) -> bool:
+    if not isinstance(submitted_id, str) or not isinstance(submitted_password, str):
+        return False
+    id_matches = hmac.compare_digest(
+        submitted_id.encode("utf-8"), credentials.admin_id.encode("utf-8")
+    )
+    password_matches = hmac.compare_digest(
+        submitted_password.encode("utf-8"), credentials.password.encode("utf-8")
+    )
+    return id_matches and password_matches
+
+
+def enforce_failed_login_delay(
+    *,
+    started_at: float,
+    minimum_seconds: float = MINIMUM_FAILURE_DELAY_SECONDS,
+    monotonic: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic,
+    sleep: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep,
+) -> None:
+    remaining = minimum_seconds - (monotonic() - started_at)
+    if remaining > 0:
+        sleep(remaining)
+
+
+def get_auth_correlation_id(
+    session_state: MutableMapping[str, object],
+    *,
+    token_hex: CallableABC[[int], str] = secrets.token_hex,
+) -> str:
+    existing = session_state.get(AUTH_CORRELATION_SESSION_KEY)
+    if isinstance(existing, str) and existing:
+        return existing
+    correlation_id = token_hex(8)
+    session_state[AUTH_CORRELATION_SESSION_KEY] = correlation_id
+    return correlation_id
+
+
+def log_auth_event(event: str, correlation_id: str) -> None:
+    logger.info("dashboard_auth event=%s correlation_id=%s", event, correlation_id)
+
+
+def _derived_signing_key(settings: AuthSettings) -> bytes:
+    return hmac.new(
+        settings.signing_secret.encode("utf-8"),
+        _TOKEN_CONTEXT + settings.admin_id.encode("utf-8") + b"\x00" + settings.admin_password.encode("utf-8"),
+        hashlib.sha256,
+    ).digest()
+
+
+def _serializer_for(settings: AuthSettings) -> URLSafeSerializer:
+    return URLSafeSerializer(
+        secret_key=_derived_signing_key(settings),
+        salt=_TOKEN_SALT,
+        signer_kwargs={"digest_method": hashlib.sha256},
+    )
+
+
+def issue_persistent_token(
+    settings: AuthSettings,
+    *,
+    remember_me: bool,
+    now: float | None = None,
+    token_id: str | None = None,
+) -> IssuedPersistentToken:
+    issued_at = int(time.time() if now is None else now)
+    ttl = (
+        REMEMBER_ME_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS if remember_me else DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS
+    )
+    expires_at = issued_at + ttl
+    jti = secrets.token_urlsafe(16) if token_id is None else token_id
+    payload = {
+        "v": _TOKEN_VERSION,
+        "sub": _TOKEN_SUBJECT,
+        "iat": issued_at,
+        "exp": expires_at,
+        "jti": jti,
+    }
+    return IssuedPersistentToken(
+        value=_serializer_for(settings).dumps(payload),
+        issued_at=issued_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        max_age=ttl,
+    )
+
+
+def verify_persistent_token(
+    settings: AuthSettings | None,
+    token: object,
+    *,
+    now: float | None = None,
+) -> VerifiedPersistentToken | None:
+    if settings is None or not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+        return None
+    if len(token) > MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH:
+        return None
+    try:
+        payload = _serializer_for(settings).loads(token)
+    except (BadData, TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or frozenset(payload) != _TOKEN_FIELDS:
+        return None
+
+    version = payload.get("v")
+    subject = payload.get("sub")
+    issued_at = payload.get("iat")
+    expires_at = payload.get("exp")
+    token_id = payload.get("jti")
+    if (
+        type(version) is not int
+        or version != _TOKEN_VERSION
+        or subject != _TOKEN_SUBJECT
+        or type(issued_at) is not int
+        or type(expires_at) is not int
+        or not isinstance(token_id, str)
+        or not token_id
+        or len(token_id) > 256
+    ):
+        return None
+    current_time = int(time.time() if now is None else now)
+    ttl = expires_at - issued_at
+    if ttl not in {DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, REMEMBER_ME_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS}:
+        return None
+    if issued_at > current_time + CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS or expires_at <= current_time:
+        return None
+
+    return VerifiedPersistentToken(
+        subject=subject,
+        issued_at=issued_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        token_id=token_id,
+    )
+
+
+def _request_cookie() -> str | None:
+    try:
+        value = st.context.cookies.get(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME)
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+    return value if isinstance(value, str) and value else None
+
+
+def _query_error() -> str | None:
+    try:
+        value = st.query_params.get("auth_error")
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+    return value if isinstance(value, str) else None
+
+
+def _render_login(*, clear_cookie: bool = False) -> None:
+    st.title("관리자 로그인")
+    st.caption("Dashboard를 사용하려면 관리자 자격 증명이 필요합니다.")
+    if _query_error() == "invalid":
+        st.error(INVALID_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE)
+    elif _query_error() == "unavailable":
+        st.error(CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE)
+    st.markdown(
+        """
+<form action="/api/auth/login" method="post">
+  <label for="jarca-admin-id">관리자 ID</label>
+  <input id="jarca-admin-id" name="admin_id" type="text" autocomplete="username" required>
+  <label for="jarca-admin-password">비밀번호</label>
+  <input id="jarca-admin-password" name="admin_password" type="password" autocomplete="current-password" required>
+  <label><input name="remember_me" type="checkbox"> 로그인 상태 유지 (30일)</label>
+  <button type="submit">로그인</button>
+</form>
+""",
+        unsafe_allow_html=True,
+    )
+    if clear_cookie:
+        st.markdown(
+            "<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=/api/auth/cleanup\">",
+            unsafe_allow_html=True,
+        )
+
+
+def _render_logout() -> None:
+    with st.sidebar:
+        st.markdown(
+            """
+<form action="/api/auth/logout" method="post">
+  <button type="submit">로그아웃</button>
+</form>
+""",
+            unsafe_allow_html=True,
+        )
+
+
+def require_dashboard_authentication() -> bool:
+    """Validate the server-signed cookie before allowing any dashboard access."""
+    correlation_id = get_auth_correlation_id(st.session_state)
+    cookie = _request_cookie()
+    settings = load_auth_settings()
+    if settings is None:
+        log_auth_event("configuration_error", correlation_id)
+        _render_login(clear_cookie=cookie is not None)
+        st.error(CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE)
+        return False
+
+    verified = verify_persistent_token(settings, cookie)
+    if verified is None:
+        log_auth_event("authentication_required", correlation_id)
+        _render_login(clear_cookie=cookie is not None)
+        return False
+
+    log_auth_event("token_accepted", correlation_id)
+    _render_logout()
+    return True
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from streamlit import App
+
+from dashboard.auth_server import create_auth_routes
+
+APP_SCRIPT = Path(__file__).with_name("app.py")
+app = App(APP_SCRIPT, routes=create_auth_routes())
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# k3s 배포
+
+`base/`는 MCP와 Dashboard를 같은 SQLite PVC에 두는 단일 Deployment 구조입니다. Dashboard 인증 secret은 base manifest에 실제 값으로 저장하지 않습니다.
+
+## 사전 준비
+
+namespace와 승인된 secret manager 절차를 준비합니다.
+
+```bash
+kubectl apply -f deploy/k8s/base/namespace.yaml
+```
+
+`jarca-ledger` namespace의 Dashboard secret에는 다음 key만 둡니다.
+
+- `admin-id`
+- `admin-password`
+- `signing-secret` (UTF-8 32 byte 이상의 독립 random value)
+
+Registry credential은 `imagePullSecrets`로만 사용합니다. 실제 secret 값, token, cookie를 Git, manifest, command history 또는 문서에 기록하지 마세요.
+
+## 배포
+
+검증된 release digest를 외부 environment overlay에서 고정하고 적용합니다.
+
+```bash
+kubectl apply -k environments/production/jarca-ledger
+kubectl -n jarca-ledger rollout status deployment/jarca-ledger
+kubectl -n jarca-ledger get pods,svc,pvc
+```
+
+MCP와 Dashboard container 및 init container는 동일 digest를 사용해야 합니다. SQLite를 공유하므로 replicas는 `1`, update 전략은 `Recreate`입니다.
+
+## Dashboard 인증 운영
+
+Frontend container에만 다음 환경변수를 Kubernetes Secret 또는 동등한 secret store에서 주입합니다.
+
+- `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID`
+- `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD`
+- `JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET`
+
+환경변수가 누락·빈 값·read error·짧은 secret이면 Dashboard는 fail-closed합니다. token subject는 고정 비민감 role `dashboard-admin`이며 server-only configured credential binding을 사용합니다. DB-backed session/token registry와 per-token revocation은 없습니다. Password, signing secret 또는 admin ID rotation은 기존 token을 전체 무효화합니다.
+
+공개 Dashboard origin에는 TLS가 필수입니다. Ingress 또는 reverse proxy는 `Host`, `Origin`, `Referer`, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`를 보존해야 하며 `FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS`는 실제 ingress-controller source IP/CIDR로 제한합니다. `*` 또는 불특정 network를 사용하지 마세요. Login과 `/api/auth/logout`은 same-origin HTTPS POST이고 `/api/auth/cleanup` GET은 same-origin HTTPS `Referer`를 검증합니다. Invalid cookie는 cleanup route의 matching `Max-Age=0` deletion 뒤 unauthenticated page로 이동하고, explicit logout도 같은 deletion을 수행합니다. 인증 실패 지연은 rate limiting을 대체하지 않으므로 TLS ingress 경계에 별도 rate limit을 적용합니다.
+
+Base는 인증 계층이 없는 MCP port `8000`을 Service로 공개하지 않고 NetworkPolicy로 ingress를 제한합니다. NetworkPolicy enforcement는 운영 cluster에서 확인해야 합니다.
+
+## SQLite와 PVC
+
+- PVC 전체를 `/data`에 mount하여 SQLite journal/WAL/SHM을 함께 보존합니다.
+- `replicas: 1`과 `Recreate`를 유지하여 두 Pod가 같은 SQLite를 동시에 열지 않게 합니다.
+- 별도 저장소로 backup을 내보내며 PVC만 재해 복구로 간주하지 않습니다.
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: jarca-ledger
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: jarca-ledger
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: jarca-ledger
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: jarca-ledger
+    spec:
+      automountServiceAccountToken: false
+      enableServiceLinks: false
+      terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 30
+      imagePullSecrets:
+        - name: jarca-ledger-registry
+      nodeSelector:
+        kubernetes.io/os: linux
+        kubernetes.io/arch: arm64
+      securityContext:
+        runAsNonRoot: true
+        runAsUser: 1000
+        runAsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroup: 1000
+        fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
+        seccompProfile:
+          type: RuntimeDefault
+      initContainers:
+        - name: init-db
+          image: gitea.jsfamily.quest/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp:v0.1.3
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - python
+            - -c
+            - >-
+              from jarca_ledger_mcp.service import health_check;
+              result = health_check();
+              assert result["success"], result
+          env:
+            - name: JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH
+              value: /data/ledger.sqlite3
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /tmp
+            - name: TMPDIR
+              value: /tmp
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+            - name: init-tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+      containers:
+        - name: mcp
+          image: gitea.jsfamily.quest/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp:v0.1.3
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          env:
+            - name: JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH
+              value: /data/ledger.sqlite3
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /tmp
+            - name: TMPDIR
+              value: /tmp
+          ports:
+            - name: mcp
+              containerPort: 8000
+              protocol: TCP
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          startupProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: mcp
+            periodSeconds: 5
+            timeoutSeconds: 2
+            failureThreshold: 24
+          readinessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: mcp
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 2
+            failureThreshold: 3
+          livenessProbe:
+            tcpSocket:
+              port: mcp
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 2
+            failureThreshold: 3
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+            - name: mcp-tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+        - name: dashboard
+          image: gitea.jsfamily.quest/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp:v0.1.3
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+          command:
+            - uvicorn
+            - dashboard.server:app
+            - --host
+            - 0.0.0.0
+            - --port
+            - "8501"
+            - --proxy-headers
+          env:
+            - name: JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH
+              value: /data/ledger.sqlite3
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /tmp
+            - name: TMPDIR
+              value: /tmp
+            - name: JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: jarca-ledger-dashboard-auth
+                  key: admin-id
+            - name: JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: jarca-ledger-dashboard-auth
+                  key: admin-password
+            - name: JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: jarca-ledger-dashboard-auth
+                  key: signing-secret
+            - name: FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS
+              value: 127.0.0.1
+          ports:
+            - name: dashboard
+              containerPort: 8501
+              protocol: TCP
+          securityContext:
+            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
+            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
+            capabilities:
+              drop: ["ALL"]
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /_stcore/health
+              port: dashboard
+            periodSeconds: 5
+            timeoutSeconds: 2
+            failureThreshold: 24
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /_stcore/health
+              port: dashboard
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            timeoutSeconds: 2
+            failureThreshold: 3
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /_stcore/health
+              port: dashboard
+            periodSeconds: 20
+            timeoutSeconds: 2
+            failureThreshold: 3
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data
+            - name: dashboard-tmp
+              mountPath: /tmp
+      volumes:
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: jarca-ledger-data
+        - name: init-tmp
+          emptyDir: {}
+        - name: mcp-tmp
+          emptyDir: {}
+        - name: dashboard-tmp
+          emptyDir: {}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: jarca-ledger
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml
+  - pvc.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - services.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: jarca-ledger
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: jarca-ledger-ingress
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: jarca-ledger
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+  ingress:
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8501
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: jarca-ledger-data
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  storageClassName: local-path
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 1Gi
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: jarca-ledger-dashboard
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: jarca-ledger
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 8501
+      targetPort: dashboard
+      appProtocol: http
@@ -29,24 +29,22 @@ services:
      - "40059:8501"
    environment:
      JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH: /data/ledger.sqlite3
+      JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID: ${JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID:?set JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID}
+      JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?set JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD}
+      JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET: ${JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET:?set JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET}
+      FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS: ${JARCA_DASHBOARD_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS:-127.0.0.1}
      STREAMLIT_BROWSER_GATHER_USAGE_STATS: "false"
      PYTHONUNBUFFERED: "1"
    volumes:
      - /volume1/docker/jarca-ledger/data:/data
    command:
-      - python
-      - -m
-      - streamlit
-      - run
-      - dashboard/app.py
-      - --server.address
+      - uvicorn
+      - dashboard.server:app
+      - --host
      - 0.0.0.0
-      - --server.port
+      - --port
      - "8501"
-      - --server.headless
-      - "true"
-      - --browser.gatherUsageStats
-      - "false"
+      - --proxy-headers
    healthcheck:
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+{
+  "schema": "jarca-ledger.review-evidence/v1",
+  "issue": 6,
+  "pull_request": 7,
+  "source_review": 51,
+  "finding": "D6-23",
+  "contract_sha256": "4f734169ec896747fe39fd7f3ab75d1fc0d8cdd4903045e665beba40d80eb1fe",
+  "verified_at_utc": "2026-10-03T00:10:43Z",
+  "source_revision": "e7242a89f7f1faacbe984713a5ad211bd7bcac2b",
+  "source_tree_clean_before_evidence_write": true,
+  "environment": {
+    "os": "Linux 6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v8",
+    "architecture": "aarch64",
+    "python": "3.13.5",
+    "starlette": "1.3.1",
+    "httpx": "0.28.1",
+    "streamlit": "1.58.0",
+    "uvicorn": "0.49.0",
+    "itsdangerous": "2.2.0",
+    "credentials": "synthetic test-only values; not recorded",
+    "signing_secret": "synthetic test-only value; not recorded"
+  },
+  "commands": [
+    {
+      "purpose": "Focused route, hardened cookie, event-loop offload, and failed-delay helper verification",
+      "command": "uv run --extra dashboard --extra dev pytest -q tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py",
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "result": "29 passed; one Starlette/httpx deprecation warning",
+      "relevant_output": ".............................                                            [100%]\n=============================== warnings summary ===============================\ntests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py:11\n  /opt/data/gitea-agent/repositories/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp/worktrees/issue-6/checkout/tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py:11: StarletteDeprecationWarning: Using `httpx` with `starlette.testclient` is deprecated; install `httpx2` instead.\n    from starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\n-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html"
+    },
+    {
+      "purpose": "Real-delay concurrent failed login plus successful login and hardened cookie runtime probe",
+      "command": "uv run --extra dashboard python - <<'PY'\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport secrets\nimport time\n\nfrom starlette.requests import Request\n\nfrom dashboard import authentication\nfrom dashboard.auth_server import login\n\nadmin_id = \"synthetic-\" + secrets.token_hex(8)\nadmin_password = secrets.token_hex(16)\nos.environ[authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV] = admin_id\nos.environ[authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV] = admin_password\nos.environ[authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV] = secrets.token_hex(32)\n\n\ndef request(password: str) -> Request:\n    body = f\"admin_id={admin_id}&admin_password={password}\".encode()\n    sent = False\n\n    async def receive():\n        nonlocal sent\n        if sent:\n            return {\"type\": \"http.disconnect\"}\n        sent = True\n        return {\"type\": \"http.request\", \"body\": body, \"more_body\": False}\n\n    scope = {\n        \"type\": \"http\",\n        \"method\": \"POST\",\n        \"scheme\": \"https\",\n        \"path\": \"/api/auth/login\",\n        \"raw_path\": b\"/api/auth/login\",\n        \"query_string\": b\"\",\n        \"headers\": [\n            (b\"host\", b\"testserver\"),\n            (b\"origin\", b\"https://testserver\"),\n            (b\"content-type\", b\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"),\n        ],\n        \"client\": (\"testclient\", 50000),\n        \"server\": (\"testserver\", 443),\n    }\n    return Request(scope, receive)\n\n\nasync def main() -> None:\n    wrong_password = secrets.token_hex(16)\n    started = time.monotonic()\n    failures = [asyncio.create_task(login(request(wrong_password))) for _ in range(2)]\n    await asyncio.sleep(0.1)\n    probe_elapsed = time.monotonic() - started\n    success_started = time.monotonic()\n    success = await login(request(admin_password))\n    success_elapsed = time.monotonic() - success_started\n    failed = await asyncio.gather(*failures)\n    total_elapsed = time.monotonic() - started\n    cookie = success.headers.get(\"set-cookie\", \"\")\n    assert success.status_code == 303\n    assert success.headers[\"location\"] == \"/\"\n    assert all(marker in cookie for marker in [\"HttpOnly\", \"Secure\", \"SameSite=lax\", \"Path=/\", \"Max-Age=86400\"])\n    assert all(response.status_code == 303 for response in failed)\n    assert all(\"set-cookie\" not in response.headers for response in failed)\n    assert probe_elapsed < 0.5\n    assert success_elapsed < 0.5\n    assert 0.95 <= total_elapsed < 1.75\n    print(json.dumps({\n        \"success\": True,\n        \"source_revision\": \"e7242a89f7f1faacbe984713a5ad211bd7bcac2b\",\n        \"successful_login_status\": success.status_code,\n        \"successful_login_cookie_hardened\": True,\n        \"failed_login_statuses\": [response.status_code for response in failed],\n        \"failed_login_cookie_absent\": True,\n        \"event_loop_probe_elapsed_seconds\": round(probe_elapsed, 6),\n        \"successful_login_elapsed_seconds\": round(success_elapsed, 6),\n        \"concurrent_failed_logins_total_elapsed_seconds\": round(total_elapsed, 6),\n        \"minimum_failed_login_delay_seconds\": 1.0,\n        \"credentials_and_cookie_values_recorded\": False,\n    }, indent=2))\n\n\nasyncio.run(main())\nPY",
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "result": {
+        "success": true,
+        "source_revision": "e7242a89f7f1faacbe984713a5ad211bd7bcac2b",
+        "successful_login_status": 303,
+        "successful_login_cookie_hardened": true,
+        "failed_login_statuses": [
+          303,
+          303
+        ],
+        "failed_login_cookie_absent": true,
+        "event_loop_probe_elapsed_seconds": 0.10056,
+        "successful_login_elapsed_seconds": 0.001267,
+        "concurrent_failed_logins_total_elapsed_seconds": 1.00614,
+        "minimum_failed_login_delay_seconds": 1.0,
+        "credentials_and_cookie_values_recorded": false
+      },
+      "relevant_output": "{\n  \"success\": true,\n  \"source_revision\": \"e7242a89f7f1faacbe984713a5ad211bd7bcac2b\",\n  \"successful_login_status\": 303,\n  \"successful_login_cookie_hardened\": true,\n  \"failed_login_statuses\": [\n    303,\n    303\n  ],\n  \"failed_login_cookie_absent\": true,\n  \"event_loop_probe_elapsed_seconds\": 0.10056,\n  \"successful_login_elapsed_seconds\": 0.001267,\n  \"concurrent_failed_logins_total_elapsed_seconds\": 1.00614,\n  \"minimum_failed_login_delay_seconds\": 1.0,\n  \"credentials_and_cookie_values_recorded\": false\n}"
+    }
+  ],
+  "hashes_sha256": {
+    "dashboard/auth_server.py": "4b991fbe942b573f8be270538b7e9df81bca9ffed3a8982f09db0d95d26e66d1",
+    "dashboard/authentication.py": "63df2e33ef10859039c9b8140e92cbf0c7c8c9fe2d19cfcedbf16637c8cc2596",
+    "tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py": "8b96421af776b613867a8a5ab5dd962033b39d1cc616ba4e91cf3c4de63a1f0d",
+    "tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py": "1ca7ecc4d4db55c674aa2934d665b121476ff5fa2e1f74071090a67e815af676",
+    "pyproject.toml": "64100d3aa1c2272df2e2139ed435724901f7215ea72e48bee9d73f95e7e53a8d"
+  },
+  "redaction": {
+    "credentials_recorded": false,
+    "signing_secret_recorded": false,
+    "token_or_cookie_value_recorded": false,
+    "request_body_recorded": false,
+    "raw_set_cookie_recorded": false
+  },
+  "notes": [
+    "This artifact is an evidence-only descendant of source_revision; the application and test paths hashed above were not modified before these commands ran.",
+    "The runtime probe exercised the changed streaming login path with synthetic credentials, confirmed hardened 24-hour cookie issuance, retained the real one-second failed-login delay, and showed the event loop and a successful login remained responsive while two failed requests waited.",
+    "This D6-23 evidence does not replace or claim a fresh browser run; D6-22 remains supported by docs/evidence/issue-6-persistent-auth-https.json and the Review #51 change-impact analysis."
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+{
+  "claims": [
+    {
+      "id": "f003-unicode-success",
+      "pointers": [
+        "commands[0].argv",
+        "commands[0].exit_code",
+        "commands[0].output",
+        "commands[0].started_at_utc",
+        "commands[0].finished_at_utc"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "f003-generic-delayed-failure",
+      "pointers": [
+        "commands[0].argv",
+        "commands[0].exit_code",
+        "commands[0].output",
+        "commands[0].started_at_utc",
+        "commands[0].finished_at_utc"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "f003-malformed-utf8-400-no-cookie",
+      "pointers": [
+        "commands[0].argv",
+        "commands[0].exit_code",
+        "commands[0].output",
+        "commands[0].started_at_utc",
+        "commands[0].finished_at_utc"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "full-regression",
+      "pointers": [
+        "commands[1].argv",
+        "commands[1].exit_code",
+        "commands[1].output",
+        "commands[1].started_at_utc",
+        "commands[1].finished_at_utc"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "static-and-source-integrity",
+      "pointers": [
+        "commands[2].argv",
+        "commands[2].exit_code",
+        "commands[2].output",
+        "commands[3].argv",
+        "commands[3].exit_code",
+        "commands[3].output",
+        "commands[4].argv",
+        "commands[4].exit_code",
+        "commands[4].output"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "commands": [
+    {
+      "argv": [
+        ".venv/bin/python",
+        "-m",
+        "pytest",
+        "-o",
+        "addopts=",
+        "-q",
+        "-p",
+        "no:cacheprovider",
+        "--basetemp=/tmp/jarca-f003-evidence-focused",
+        "tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py",
+        "tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py"
+      ],
+      "duration_seconds": 11.436193,
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "expected_exit_code": 0,
+      "finished_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:55:21.516159Z",
+      "id": "focused-tests",
+      "output": "................................                                         [100%]\n=============================== warnings summary ===============================\ntests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py:11\n  /opt/data/gitea-agent/repositories/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp/worktrees/issue-6/checkout/tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py:11: StarletteDeprecationWarning: Using `httpx` with `starlette.testclient` is deprecated; install `httpx2` instead.\n    from starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\n-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html\n32 passed, 1 warning in 7.81s\n",
+      "purpose": "F-003 Unicode success, delayed generic mismatch, malformed percent-encoded UTF-8, and credential helper verification",
+      "started_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:55:10.080020Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "argv": [
+        ".venv/bin/python",
+        "-m",
+        "pytest",
+        "-o",
+        "addopts=",
+        "-q",
+        "-p",
+        "no:cacheprovider",
+        "--basetemp=/tmp/jarca-f003-evidence-full"
+      ],
+      "duration_seconds": 54.086422,
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "expected_exit_code": 0,
+      "finished_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.670519Z",
+      "id": "full-tests",
+      "output": "........................................................................ [ 59%]\n...................ss........................ss...                       [100%]\n=============================== warnings summary ===============================\ntests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py:11\n  /opt/data/gitea-agent/repositories/jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp/worktrees/issue-6/checkout/tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py:11: StarletteDeprecationWarning: Using `httpx` with `starlette.testclient` is deprecated; install `httpx2` instead.\n    from starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\n-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html\n118 passed, 4 skipped, 1 warning in 49.12s\n",
+      "purpose": "Complete repository regression suite",
+      "started_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:55:21.584157Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "argv": [
+        ".venv/bin/ruff",
+        "check",
+        "--no-cache",
+        "dashboard/authentication.py",
+        "dashboard/auth_server.py",
+        "tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py",
+        "tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py"
+      ],
+      "duration_seconds": 0.025974,
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "expected_exit_code": 0,
+      "finished_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.770278Z",
+      "id": "ruff",
+      "output": "All checks passed!\n",
+      "purpose": "Static lint for the exact F-003 source and test allowlist",
+      "started_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.744356Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "argv": [
+        "uv",
+        "lock",
+        "--check",
+        "--offline"
+      ],
+      "duration_seconds": 0.059792,
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "expected_exit_code": 0,
+      "finished_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.890498Z",
+      "id": "lock-check",
+      "output": "Resolved 72 packages in 3ms\n",
+      "purpose": "Offline dependency lock consistency",
+      "started_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.830762Z"
+    },
+    {
+      "argv": [
+        "git",
+        "diff",
+        "--check",
+        "d84ed8ff2a53cd2735eceaaf0c54cb40c7c2c3ad^",
+        "d84ed8ff2a53cd2735eceaaf0c54cb40c7c2c3ad"
+      ],
+      "duration_seconds": 0.033395,
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "expected_exit_code": 0,
+      "finished_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.992735Z",
+      "id": "source-diff-check",
+      "output": "",
+      "purpose": "Whitespace validation for the exact source commit",
+      "started_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.959398Z"
+    }
+  ],
+  "contract_sha256": "4f734169ec896747fe39fd7f3ab75d1fc0d8cdd4903045e665beba40d80eb1fe",
+  "environment": {
+    "architecture": "aarch64",
+    "child_environment_keys": [
+      "HOME",
+      "NO_COLOR",
+      "PATH",
+      "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE"
+    ],
+    "credentials": "synthetic test-only values supplied by tests; not recorded",
+    "dependencies": {
+      "httpx": "0.28.1",
+      "itsdangerous": "2.2.0",
+      "pytest": "9.1.1",
+      "starlette": "1.3.1",
+      "streamlit": "1.58.0",
+      "uvicorn": "0.49.0"
+    },
+    "os": "Linux-6.18.34+rpt-rpi-v8-aarch64-with-glibc2.41",
+    "python": "3.13.5",
+    "signing_secret": "synthetic test-only value supplied by tests; not recorded"
+  },
+  "finding": "F-003",
+  "issue": 6,
+  "limitations": [
+    "The focused adapter tests use Starlette TestClient rather than a newly executed external browser or deployed Compose/Kubernetes environment.",
+    "The existing Starlette/httpx deprecation warning is retained and is unrelated to F-003."
+  ],
+  "notes": [
+    "This evidence-only descendant binds verification to source_revision; the listed source bytes and Git blob OIDs were unchanged before, during, and after every command.",
+    "No command used credentials, signing secrets, authorization headers, raw cookies, or shell interpretation in argv."
+  ],
+  "pull_request": 7,
+  "redaction": {
+    "credentials_recorded": false,
+    "raw_set_cookie_recorded": false,
+    "request_body_recorded": false,
+    "signing_secret_recorded": false,
+    "token_or_cookie_value_recorded": false
+  },
+  "schema": "jarca-ledger.review-evidence/v2",
+  "source_review": 53,
+  "source_revision": "d84ed8ff2a53cd2735eceaaf0c54cb40c7c2c3ad",
+  "source_tree_clean_before_evidence_write": true,
+  "sources": {
+    "dashboard/auth_server.py": {
+      "git_blob_oid": "0546d582805f495c86dcdbb45510431f7699ecfd",
+      "sha256": "94675feffbc0807a632d51a9feea8aa4d8834a37de2d8f32c50aa273d88ddab3"
+    },
+    "dashboard/authentication.py": {
+      "git_blob_oid": "006d3c95661b64924a89aa952ff531095d4684db",
+      "sha256": "260c3419040a883a76ced3fd1a1ff43f86763e608448fff57078c30a54c74213"
+    },
+    "pyproject.toml": {
+      "git_blob_oid": "2892966feaaa8dfa07bf330997afc8315364a672",
+      "sha256": "64100d3aa1c2272df2e2139ed435724901f7215ea72e48bee9d73f95e7e53a8d"
+    },
+    "tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py": {
+      "git_blob_oid": "0508f54f74185fc4fda341fcdd2574cbadb0d203",
+      "sha256": "6b226b8d0d207a84f788b090de67fe6ddf9e7c8e05218ce18d97aa4badac95f5"
+    },
+    "tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py": {
+      "git_blob_oid": "4d16765c4ab64826144d4880ec27b489a02bc53d",
+      "sha256": "d6758e91b2e275cb22f55929ce0bf4a775feecb23f720fa05151da1ebb4da036"
+    },
+    "uv.lock": {
+      "git_blob_oid": "c92cadb5bf8ae12e603fa956177c5d7f12e58535",
+      "sha256": "9582546bc7c97a25b5d40d66ee814203ae46c13e7263942d02008403abd33c73"
+    }
+  },
+  "verified_at_utc": "2026-10-04T03:56:15.992735Z"
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+{
+  "schema": "jarca-ledger.auth-evidence/v2",
+  "issue": 6,
+  "pull_request": 7,
+  "source_review": 44,
+  "verified_at_utc": "2026-10-02T03:03:47Z",
+  "source_revision": "7bb959859a84f1d1293afd1f0270cca18f4cd576",
+  "source_tree_clean_before_evidence_write": true,
+  "transport": "HTTPS browser origin terminating to a loopback-only Uvicorn test server",
+  "browser_runner": {
+    "interface": "Playwright MCP",
+    "engine": "Chromium 154",
+    "architecture": "arm",
+    "bitness": "64",
+    "platform": "Linux",
+    "secure_context": true
+  },
+  "environment": {
+    "synthetic_database": true,
+    "operating_ledger_used": false,
+    "credentials": "synthetic test-only values; not recorded",
+    "signing_secret": "synthetic test-only value; not recorded",
+    "temporary_https_ingress": true
+  },
+  "local_checks": [
+    {
+      "command": "uv run --extra dashboard --extra dev pytest -q",
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "result": "111 passed, 4 skipped"
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "uv run --extra dashboard --extra dev ruff check dashboard tests scripts",
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "result": "All checks passed"
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "uv run --extra dashboard --extra dev python -m compileall -q dashboard scripts tests",
+      "exit_code": 0,
+      "result": "passed"
+    }
+  ],
+  "browser_results": {
+    "initial_login_page_visible": true,
+    "login": {
+      "status": 303,
+      "location": "/",
+      "cookie_name": "__Host-jarca_dashboard_auth",
+      "cookie_value": "[REDACTED]",
+      "secure": true,
+      "http_only": true,
+      "same_site": "Lax",
+      "path": "/",
+      "domain_attribute_absent": true,
+      "max_age_seconds": 2592000,
+      "document_cookie_exposed_auth_cookie": false
+    },
+    "restoration": {
+      "new_tab": true,
+      "query_page": "Import",
+      "authenticated_page_visible": true,
+      "login_page_visible": false
+    },
+    "invalid_cookie_cleanup": {
+      "injected_value": "[REDACTED TEST SENTINEL]",
+      "cleanup_status": 303,
+      "location": "/",
+      "matching_cookie_deletion": true,
+      "max_age_seconds": 0,
+      "cookie_count_after_cleanup": 0,
+      "unauthenticated_page_visible": true
+    },
+    "logout": {
+      "status": 303,
+      "location": "/",
+      "matching_cookie_deletion": true,
+      "max_age_seconds": 0,
+      "cookie_count_after_logout": 0,
+      "unauthenticated_page_visible": true,
+      "document_cookie_exposed_auth_cookie": false
+    }
+  },
+  "hashes_sha256": {
+    "scripts/persistent_auth_http_evidence.py": "403bfcd7e281d4b1750841a969a18548a580a5f3f5116abeaf83e71e81832844",
+    "dashboard/authentication.py": "63df2e33ef10859039c9b8140e92cbf0c7c8c9fe2d19cfcedbf16637c8cc2596",
+    "dashboard/auth_server.py": "d986e10d3489938c559d4f11ae20a43a448b39aae8a27978571f193f9df0e8ca",
+    "dashboard/server.py": "633c7fd9ae8a41c656a734be641de7f1733a1636216a9dbe2e50db885ff6ec6e",
+    "pyproject.toml": "64100d3aa1c2272df2e2139ed435724901f7215ea72e48bee9d73f95e7e53a8d"
+  },
+  "notes": [
+    "The evidence artifact is an evidence-only descendant of source_revision; application, test, and configuration paths were not changed after source_revision verification.",
+    "Credentials, signing material, token values, raw cookie values, request bodies, and raw Set-Cookie values were not recorded.",
+    "The actual ARM64 Chromium browser performed login, HttpOnly storage, new-tab restoration, invalid-cookie cleanup, and logout deletion."
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+# Interface Contract — Dashboard 관리자 인증
+
+## 목적과 범위
+
+Dashboard 인증 설정, login/cleanup/logout HTTP route, signed cookie와 Streamlit gate의 외부·내부 계약을 정의한다.
+
+- 포함 범위: 환경변수, HTTPS form POST, cookie 발급·삭제, fail-closed gate
+- 제외 범위: MCP 인증, OAuth/OIDC, 다중 사용자, DB session/token registry, per-token revocation
+- 사용 주체: browser, Dashboard ASGI server, Streamlit app, 운영 배포
+
+## 계약
+
+### auth-config — 서버 인증 설정
+
+- 책임: 현재 configured credential과 signing secret을 server-only로 제공한다.
+- 종류·프로토콜: process environment
+- 호출 대상·operation: `load_auth_settings()`
+- 버전: 2.0
+- 호출 주체: Dashboard server
+- 인증 방식: 없음
+- 필요 권한: process secret read
+
+#### 입력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 기본값 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID` | environment | `string` | 필수 | 없음 | non-empty | configured admin identifier | 민감 |
+| `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | environment | `string` | 필수 | 없음 | non-empty | configured credential | 민감 |
+| `JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET` | environment | `string` | 필수 | 없음 | UTF-8 32 byte 이상 | signing input | 민감 |
+
+#### 출력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `AuthSettings` | server memory | `object` | 성공 시 필수 | current configured values | verifier input; never serialized | 민감 |
+
+#### 오류
+
+| 코드 | 분류 | 발생 조건 | 재시도 가능 여부 | 호출자 대응 | 실패 시 상태 변경 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `configuration_unavailable` | configuration | missing/empty/read error/short secret | 수정 후 가능 | generic unavailable | no cookie, no DB |
+
+### login — `POST /api/auth/login`
+
+- 책임: same-origin HTTPS credential을 검증하고 signed cookie를 발급한다.
+- 종류·프로토콜: HTTPS form POST
+- 호출 대상·operation: `/api/auth/login`
+- 버전: 1.0
+- 호출 주체: browser login form
+- 인증 방식: submitted credential, server-only comparison
+- 필요 권한: same-origin HTTPS
+
+#### 입력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 기본값 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `admin_id` | form body | `string` | 필수 | 없음 | bounded form value | submitted ID | 민감 |
+| `admin_password` | form body | `string` | 필수 | 없음 | bounded form value | submitted password | 민감 |
+| `remember_me` | form body | `string` | 선택 | off | `on` or absent | choose 30-day TTL | 비민감 |
+| `Origin` | request header | `URL` | 필수 | 없음 | request `Host`와 scheme·hostname·effective port가 같은 HTTPS origin | CSRF origin 검증 | 비민감 |
+
+#### 출력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `Set-Cookie` | response header | `cookie` | success | hardened auth cookie, redacted value | persistent auth | 값은 민감 |
+| `Location` | response header | `string` | success/failure | `/` or generic error path | browser navigation | 비민감 |
+
+발급 token은 `v`, `sub=dashboard-admin`, `iat`, `exp`, `jti` claim만 가진다. `sub=dashboard-admin`은 관리자 ID가 아닌 고정 비민감 role이고, token 값과 서명은 민감하므로 browser의 hardened cookie에만 저장한다. 성공한 login 시각에 `iat`와 `exp`를 한 번 고정하며 기본 TTL은 24시간, `remember_me=on`이면 30일이다. 활동, 일반 요청, rerun 또는 인증 복원은 token을 재발급하거나 두 시각을 연장하지 않는다.
+
+#### 오류
+
+| 코드 | 분류 | 발생 조건 | 재시도 가능 여부 | 호출자 대응 | 실패 시 상태 변경 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `400` | request | malformed/oversized body | 수정 후 가능 | resubmit valid form | no cookie |
+| `403` | origin | non-HTTPS or cross-origin | 수정 후 가능 | use same-origin HTTPS | no cookie |
+| `invalid` | authentication | ID/password mismatch | 가능 | generic error and delay | no cookie |
+| `unavailable` | configuration | invalid server configuration | config fix 후 | generic unavailable | no cookie |
+
+### cleanup — `GET /api/auth/cleanup`
+
+- 책임: invalid cookie를 matching scope로 삭제한 뒤 unauthenticated navigation을 완료한다.
+- 종류·프로토콜: HTTPS navigation GET
+- 호출 대상·operation: `/api/auth/cleanup`
+- 버전: 1.0
+- 호출 주체: same-origin browser/auth gate
+- 인증 방식: same-origin HTTPS `Referer`; token validity 불필요
+- 필요 권한: same-origin HTTPS
+
+#### 입력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 기본값 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `Referer` | request header | `URL` | 필수 | 없음 | request origin과 같은 HTTPS authority | navigation origin 검증 | 비민감 |
+
+#### 출력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `Set-Cookie` | response header | `cookie` | always | same name/path/security, `Max-Age=0` | delete stale cookie | 값은 민감 |
+| `Location` | response header | `string` | success | `/` | unauthenticated page | 비민감 |
+
+#### 오류
+
+| 코드 | 분류 | 발생 조건 | 재시도 가능 여부 | 호출자 대응 | 실패 시 상태 변경 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `403` | origin | non-HTTPS/cross-origin | 가능 | retry same-origin | no DB |
+
+### logout — `POST /api/auth/logout`
+
+- 책임: explicit logout으로 browser cookie를 삭제한다.
+- 종류·프로토콜: HTTPS form POST
+- 호출 대상·operation: `/api/auth/logout`
+- 버전: 1.0
+- 호출 주체: authenticated browser
+- 인증 방식: same-origin HTTPS; server-side revocation 없음
+- 필요 권한: same-origin HTTPS
+
+#### 입력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 기본값 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `none` | none | `none` | 선택 | 없음 | no credential accepted | explicit logout | 없음 |
+| `Origin` | request header | `URL` | 필수 | 없음 | request `Host`와 scheme·hostname·effective port가 같은 HTTPS origin | CSRF origin 검증 | 비민감 |
+
+#### 출력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `Set-Cookie` | response header | `cookie` | always | matching deletion, `Max-Age=0` | remove browser cookie | 값은 민감 |
+| `Location` | response header | `string` | success | `/` | unauthenticated page | 비민감 |
+
+#### 오류
+
+| 코드 | 분류 | 발생 조건 | 재시도 가능 여부 | 호출자 대응 | 실패 시 상태 변경 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `403` | origin | non-HTTPS/cross-origin | 가능 | retry same-origin | no DB |
+
+### gate — Dashboard 인증 경계
+
+- 책임: config and cookie verification before any protected work.
+- 종류·프로토콜: Python/Streamlit call
+- 호출 대상·operation: `require_dashboard_authentication()`
+- 버전: 2.0
+- 호출 주체: `dashboard.app.main()`
+- 인증 방식: current config plus signed cookie
+- 필요 권한: valid token with `sub=dashboard-admin`
+
+#### 입력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 기본값 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `auth_cookie` | request cookie | `string` | success path | absent | current configuration으로 서명을 검증할 수 있고 claim이 정확히 `v`, `sub=dashboard-admin`, `iat`, `exp`, `jti`인 token | browser proof | 값과 서명은 민감; `sub`는 비민감 |
+
+#### 출력
+
+| 필드 | 위치 | 타입 | 필수 여부 | 허용 값·형식 | 의미 | 민감정보 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `authenticated` | server result | `bool` | always | true/false | gate decision | 비민감 |
+
+#### 오류
+
+| 코드 | 분류 | 발생 조건 | 재시도 가능 여부 | 호출자 대응 | 실패 시 상태 변경 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `unauthenticated` | authentication | absent/invalid/expired/config failure | login 가능 | cleanup then show login | no protected work |
+
+관리자 ID, password 또는 signing secret 변경은 server-only signing key binding을 바꾸므로 기존 token을 모두 무효화하고 cleanup으로 전이한다. DB session, token registry와 per-token revocation은 만들지 않는다.
+
+## 호환성
+
+- 유지할 기존 호출 방식: authenticated `page` query parameter, page dispatch, gateway와 MCP behavior
+- 버전 변경 정책: REQ-001 revision 2.0; session-only boolean을 signed cookie로 대체
+- 폐기 정책: client-side token storage, DB-backed session, per-token revocation 없음
+- 재시도 계약: credential 실패는 최소 1초 지연; origin/request 오류는 수정 후 재시도
+- 중복 처리 계약: login은 새 token 발급 가능; cleanup/logout deletion은 idempotent
+- 순서 보장: config → cookie verify → cleanup if invalid → DB/page dispatch only if valid
+- 만료 보장: login 성공 시 고정한 `iat`와 `exp`는 활동·일반 요청·rerun·복원에서 변경하거나 연장하지 않음
+
+## 예시
+
+### example-login — 정상 login
+
+- 대상 인터페이스: `login`
+
+#### 호출
+
+```text
+POST /api/auth/login
+Origin: https://dashboard.example
+admin_id=<submitted>&admin_password=<submitted>&remember_me=on
+```
+
+#### 결과
+
+```text
+303 Location: /
+Set-Cookie: __Host-jarca_dashboard_auth=<redacted>; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/; Max-Age=2592000
+```
+
+### example-cleanup — invalid cookie cleanup
+
+- 대상 인터페이스: `cleanup`
+
+#### 호출
+
+```text
+GET /api/auth/cleanup
+Referer: https://dashboard.example/
+```
+
+#### 결과
+
+```text
+303 Location: /
+Set-Cookie: __Host-jarca_dashboard_auth=; Max-Age=0; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/
+```
+
+## 검증
+
+- 정상 계약: authentication/server tests와 loopback HTTPS evidence
+- 실패 계약: wrong credential, invalid configuration, cross-origin, malformed cookie tests
+- 경계 계약: expiry, rotation, oversized token, same-host different-port origin tests
+- 구현·스키마·예시 정합성: `tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py`, `tests/test_dashboard_authentication_app.py`, `tests/test_dashboard_persistent_authentication.py`, source/document redaction search
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Project Structure — Dashboard 관리자 인증
+
+## 목적과 경계
+
+Issue #6 인증을 기존 Dashboard 구조에 배치하고 fail-closed 경계와 server-only secret binding을 유지한다.
+
+- 포함 경계: `dashboard/` 인증 adapter/gate, tests, 운영 문서
+- 제외 경계: MCP transport, 금융 schema, DB migration, external auth middleware
+
+## 디렉터리 구조
+
+### dashboard-source — Dashboard source
+
+```text
+dashboard/
+├── server.py
+├── auth_server.py
+├── authentication.py
+├── app.py
+└── page_views/
+```
+
+| 경로 | 종류 | 책임 | 공개 진입점 | 내부 구현 경계 | 편집 정책 | 생성 주체 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `dashboard/server.py` | source | ASGI app 조립 | `app` | route wiring only | source review required | developer |
+| `dashboard/auth_server.py` | source | login/cleanup/logout response | `create_auth_routes()` | no DB/page imports | source review required | developer |
+| `dashboard/authentication.py` | source | config, constant-time compare, token verify, gate | `require_dashboard_authentication()` | server-only secret use | source review required | developer |
+| `dashboard/app.py` | source | gate then page dispatch | `main()` | no token signing details | source review required | developer |
+| `dashboard/page_views/` | source | financial UI pages | `page_*` functions | no auth transport calls | source review required | developer |
+
+### verification-tests — 인증 검증
+
+```text
+tests/
+├── test_dashboard_authentication.py
+├── test_dashboard_persistent_authentication.py
+├── test_dashboard_auth_server.py
+└── test_dashboard_authentication_app.py
+```
+
+| 경로 | 종류 | 책임 | 공개 진입점 | 내부 구현 경계 | 편집 정책 | 생성 주체 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py` | test | credential compare, delay, redaction | pytest tests | test-only settings | source change paired with test | developer |
+| `tests/test_dashboard_persistent_authentication.py` | test | claims, TTL, tamper, rotation | pytest tests | no real secrets | source change paired with test | developer |
+| `tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py` | test | HTTP routes and cookie scope | pytest tests | synthetic test credentials | source change paired with test | developer |
+| `tests/test_dashboard_authentication_app.py` | test | gate ordering and cleanup/UI | AppTest | fixture DB only | source change paired with test | developer |
+
+### deployment-docs — 운영 문서
+
+```text
+docs/requirements/req-001_dashboard-administrator-authentication.md
+docs/interface-contract.md
+docs/runtime-flow.md
+README.md
+deploy/k8s/README.md
+```
+
+| 경로 | 종류 | 책임 | 공개 진입점 | 내부 구현 경계 | 편집 정책 | 생성 주체 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `docs/requirements/req-001_dashboard-administrator-authentication.md` | requirement | approved REQ-001 revision 2.0 | REQ-001 | canonical traceability | update in place | developer |
+| `docs/interface-contract.md` | contract | HTTP/cookie/gate contracts | contract IDs | no implementation secrets | update with API changes | developer |
+| `docs/runtime-flow.md` | design | runtime states/transitions | flow IDs | no secret values | update with flow changes | developer |
+| `README.md` | operations | local/deployment constraints | operator commands | no secret values | operational review | developer |
+| `deploy/k8s/README.md` | operations | k3s secret/TLS procedure | deployment procedure | no secret values | deployment review | developer |
+
+## 의존 방향
+
+| 출발 영역 | 대상 영역 | 허용 여부 | 규칙 | 공유 계약 위치 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `dashboard.server` | `dashboard.auth_server` | 허용 | compose ASGI routes only | `docs/interface-contract.md` |
+| `dashboard.server` | `dashboard.app` | 허용 | app remains protected by gate | `docs/runtime-flow.md` |
+| `dashboard.app` | `dashboard.authentication` | 허용 | gate precedes DB/page dispatch | `docs/interface-contract.md` |
+| `dashboard.authentication` | `dashboard.page_views` | 금지 | auth module never imports financial pages | `docs/project-structure.md` |
+| `dashboard.auth_server` | `jarca_ledger_mcp` DB | 금지 | login/cleanup/logout are DB-free | `docs/requirements/req-001_dashboard-administrator-authentication.md` |
+
+## 변경 규칙
+
+| 구분 | 규칙 |
+|---|---|
+| 새 모듈·파일 배치 | auth route/gate changes stay in `dashboard/`; no DB session module |
+| 이름·패키지 | use existing `dashboard` package and snake_case modules |
+| 소스·테스트 대응 | auth source behavior requires focused pytest/AppTest coverage |
+| 생성 산출물 | evidence may be redacted; never commit credentials, secrets, tokens, or cookie values |
+
+## 검증
+
+- 구조 검사 명령:
+
+  ```text
+  python -m compileall -q dashboard tests scripts
+  ```
+
+- 구조 검사 기대 결과: exit 0 and no generated source outside ignored bytecode locations
+- 정적 분석 명령:
+
+  ```text
+  uv run --extra dashboard --extra dev ruff check dashboard tests scripts
+  ```
+
+- 정적 분석 기대 결과: exit 0 with no diagnostics
+- 문서와 실제 트리의 정합성: every listed source/test/document path exists; dependency table has no forbidden reverse edge
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+---
+{
+  "schema": "gitea-agent.requirement/v1",
+  "id": "REQ-001",
+  "title": "Dashboard 관리자 인증",
+  "revision": "2.0",
+  "status": "approved",
+  "depends_on": [],
+  "applies_to": ["dashboard"],
+  "language": "ko"
+}
+---
+
+# REQ-001 — Dashboard 관리자 인증
+
+## 1. 목적
+
+Dashboard의 금융 기능 앞에 단일 fail-closed 관리자 인증 경계를 두고, 유효한 인증 cookie가 같은 browser profile의 새 연결에서 복원되도록 한다.
+
+## 2. 배경
+
+Issue #1의 관리자 인증을 Issue #6에서 persistent signed cookie와 명시적 logout으로 확장한다. 기존 요구사항의 정체성, 승인 범위, Issue #1과 구현 PR #3의 추적성을 유지하며 revision 2.0으로 갱신한다.
+
+## 3. 범위
+
+### 포함
+
+- Dashboard 전 기능 앞의 인증 gate와 인증 전 DB 차단
+- `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID`, `JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD`, `JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET` 기반 server-only 검증
+- constant-time credential 비교, 일반 오류, 실패당 최소 1초 지연
+- same-origin HTTPS login, cleanup, logout route
+- `Secure`/`HttpOnly`/`SameSite=Lax`/`Path=/` signed cookie와 24시간·30일 absolute TTL
+- 고정된 비민감 role subject와 설정 credential에 묶인 서명 검증
+- invalid, expired, tampered, malformed, configuration-failure cookie의 cleanup 및 matching deletion
+- password, signing-secret, admin-ID 변경에 따른 기존 token 거부
+- HTTPS, proxy, Kubernetes/Compose 운영 제약과 민감정보 비노출
+
+### 제외
+
+- 다중 사용자, RBAC, OAuth/OIDC, SSO, MFA, CAPTCHA, 계정 잠금
+- 외부 인증 proxy로 책임 이전
+- sliding expiration, DB-backed session/token registry, per-token revocation
+- MCP endpoint 인증 변경, SQLite schema/data migration
+- 다른 browser profile·기기 간 로그인 공유
+
+## 4. 용어와 기준
+
+- **role subject**: token의 `sub`에 고정 기록하는 비민감 값 `dashboard-admin`; 관리자 ID나 credential이 아니다.
+- **server-only binding**: signing secret과 현재 설정 credential을 서버에서만 읽어 key를 파생하며 browser에 값을 보내지 않는 방식.
+- **cleanup**: 인증 실패 cookie를 같은 origin의 cleanup route에서 matching name/path/security 속성으로 삭제하는 절차.
+- **canonical 근거**: Issue #1, Issue #6, 구현 PR #3 및 #7.
+
+## 5. 요구사항
+
+### REQ-001.01 — 공통 인증 경계
+
+모든 DB path, page dispatch, gateway, upload, import보다 먼저 설정과 cookie를 검증하고, 실패하면 로그인 화면만 표시한다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: `dashboard-auth-gate`
+- 영속성: 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: Dashboard page와 gateway
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: 인증 후 기존 page/query 동작 유지
+- 배포 전제 조건: 유효한 세 환경변수
+
+### REQ-001.02 — 설정과 server-only binding
+
+세 환경변수만 사용하고 누락·빈 값·read error·짧은 signing secret이면 fail-closed한다. signing key는 서버에서 configured credential과 secret으로만 파생한다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: `dashboard-auth-config`, `dashboard-auth-cookie`
+- 영속성: 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: 인증 verifier
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: Streamlit secrets/fallback 미사용
+- 배포 전제 조건: secret manager 주입
+
+### REQ-001.03 — Credential과 민감정보 비노출
+
+ID와 password는 constant-time 비교한다. credential, secret, signing material, token, raw cookie와 Set-Cookie 값은 UI, URL, log, 문서, session state에 기록하지 않는다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: login form, event log
+- 영속성: 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: 운영자와 감사 도구
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: 비민감 correlation ID만 유지
+- 배포 전제 조건: redacted logging
+
+### REQ-001.04 — Login 실패 계약
+
+ID 또는 password가 틀리면 동일한 일반 오류와 최소 1초 지연을 적용하고 상태를 변경하지 않는다. 성공에는 지연을 적용하지 않는다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: `POST /api/auth/login`
+- 영속성: 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: browser
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: 기존 login form 유지
+- 배포 전제 조건: 외부 rate limiting
+
+### REQ-001.05 — Persistent token
+
+성공 login은 기본 24시간, remember-me 선택 시 30일의 absolute TTL token을 발급한다. `iat`와 `exp`는 고정하며 활동·rerun·복원으로 연장하지 않는다. `sub`는 항상 `dashboard-admin`이다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: `dashboard-auth-cookie`
+- 영속성: browser cookie만
+- 후속 사용 주체: 새 Streamlit session
+- 마이그레이션: 기존 session boolean에서 cookie로 전환
+- 호환성: 같은 browser profile 복원
+- 배포 전제 조건: HTTPS
+
+### REQ-001.06 — Cookie 보안 속성
+
+Cookie 이름은 `__Host-jarca_dashboard_auth`이며 `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, `Path=/`, no `Domain`을 사용한다. 일반 요청은 재발급하지 않는다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: HTTP response와 browser
+- 영속성: browser cookie
+- 후속 사용 주체: browser/Streamlit handshake
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: host-only cookie
+- 배포 전제 조건: 공개 origin HTTPS
+
+### REQ-001.07 — Invalid cookie cleanup
+
+없음·malformed·oversized·tampered·expired·claim-invalid·rotation-invalid 또는 configuration-failure cookie는 보호 자원에 접근하기 전에 거부한다. 같은 origin cleanup route를 통해 동일 name/path/security 속성과 `Max-Age=0` deletion을 반환한 뒤 unauthenticated page를 표시한다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: `GET /api/auth/cleanup`, `dashboard-auth-gate`
+- 영속성: 서버 session/registry 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: browser
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: stale cookie가 남지 않음
+- 배포 전제 조건: same-origin HTTPS
+
+### REQ-001.08 — Login, cleanup, logout
+
+Login과 logout은 trusted same-origin HTTPS POST만 허용하고 cleanup GET은 same-origin HTTPS `Referer`를 검증한다. logout은 명시적으로 matching deletion을 반환한다. cleanup과 logout은 금융 DB를 변경하지 않는다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: `POST /api/auth/login`, `GET /api/auth/cleanup`, `POST /api/auth/logout`
+- 영속성: 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: browser
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: root redirect 유지
+- 배포 전제 조건: proxy가 Host/Origin/Proto 보존
+
+### REQ-001.09 — Rotation과 무상태성
+
+Token claim은 `v`, 고정 `sub`, `iat`, `exp`, `jti`만 허용한다. password, signing secret 또는 admin ID 변경은 기존 token을 거부한다. per-token revocation이나 DB session은 만들지 않는다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: token verifier
+- 영속성: revocation/session 저장소 없음
+- 후속 사용 주체: 운영 rotation 절차
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: 전체 무효화는 rotation으로 수행
+- 배포 전제 조건: 모든 replica 동일 설정
+
+### REQ-001.10 — 보호 범위와 운영
+
+인증 후 기존 page, query parameter, gateway와 MCP 동작을 유지한다. Compose/Kubernetes는 실제 secret을 저장하지 않으며 HTTPS, forwarded-header allowlist와 rate limit을 적용한다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: Dashboard 운영 진입점
+- 영속성: 기존 SQLite만
+- 후속 사용 주체: 운영 배포
+- 마이그레이션: DB migration 없음
+- 호환성: MCP endpoint는 별도 계약
+- 배포 전제 조건: TLS와 제한된 proxy CIDR
+
+### REQ-001.11 — 관찰 가능성
+
+설정 오류, 인증 필요, token 수락, login 성공/실패/reject, cleanup, logout event와 비민감 correlation ID만 기록한다. 민감 값과 구체적 검증 원인은 기록하지 않는다.
+
+**영향 범위**
+
+- 인터페이스: event log
+- 영속성: 로그에 비민감 메타데이터만
+- 후속 사용 주체: 운영 관찰 도구
+- 마이그레이션: 없음
+- 호환성: 일반 오류 메시지 유지
+- 배포 전제 조건: redaction 정책
+
+## 6. 제약과 불변조건
+
+- `sub`는 비민감 고정 role 값이며 credential에서 파생하거나 관리자 ID를 담지 않는다.
+- credential, secret, token, cookie 값은 저장·출력·문서화하지 않는다.
+- 인증 성공 전 DB/gateway/page dispatch는 실행하지 않는다.
+- 만료는 absolute이며 활동으로 연장하지 않는다.
+- invalid cookie cleanup과 explicit logout의 deletion은 발급 cookie와 matching scope를 사용한다.
+- 서버는 per-token revocation과 DB-backed session을 유지하지 않는다.
+
+## 7. 인수 기준
+
+### REQ-001.01-AC01 — 인증 전 차단
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+모든 인증 거부 경로에서 DB, gateway, page dispatch가 실행되지 않는다.
+
+**검증**
+
+AppTest와 gate ordering 테스트에서 database access sentinel이 호출되지 않음을 확인한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: integration
+- 백엔드: Streamlit AppTest
+- 케이스: missing config, no cookie, invalid cookie
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+거부 시 금융 상태와 DB는 변경되지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.02-AC01 — 설정 fail-closed
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+세 설정 중 하나라도 유효하지 않으면 일반 설정 오류로 인증을 거부한다.
+
+**검증**
+
+설정별 누락·빈 값·짧은 secret 테스트를 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: unit/integration
+- 백엔드: pytest
+- 케이스: 각 환경변수 누락, 빈 값, short secret
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+cookie 발급과 보호 자원 접근이 없다.
+
+### REQ-001.03-AC01 — 민감정보 비노출
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+credential, secret, token, cookie가 UI·URL·log·session state에 나타나지 않는다.
+
+**검증**
+
+로그·응답·session state와 문서를 redaction 검색한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: static/integration
+- 백엔드: pytest, ruff, repository search
+- 케이스: 성공·실패 login과 invalid cookie
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+비민감 correlation ID 외 인증 비밀 상태가 없다.
+
+### REQ-001.03-AC02 — 두 credential의 constant-time 비교
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+제출 ID와 password는 각각 `hmac.compare_digest`로 비교하며, 한 필드가 일치하지 않아도 다른 필드의 비교를 생략하지 않는다.
+
+**검증**
+
+`tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py::test_verify_credentials_uses_constant_time_comparison_for_both_fields`에서 성공 및 두 필드가 모두 잘못된 경우에 두 비교의 호출 순서와 인자를 계측한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: unit
+- 백엔드: pytest monkeypatch
+- 케이스: 정상 credential, 잘못된 ID와 password
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+일반 동등 비교나 한 필드 실패에 따른 short-circuit를 사용하지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.04-AC01 — 실패 지연과 일반 오류
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+잘못된 ID와 잘못된 password가 같은 일반 오류를 반환하고 각각 최소 1초 지연된다.
+
+**검증**
+
+두 실패 경로의 elapsed time과 response를 측정한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: integration
+- 백엔드: pytest/HTTP client
+- 케이스: wrong ID, wrong password
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+cookie·DB·gateway 상태가 변하지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.04-AC02 — 성공 지연·잠금 없음
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+정상 credential은 실패 지연 함수를 사용하지 않고 인증되며, 실패 횟수나 잠금 만료 상태를 생성하지 않는다.
+
+**검증**
+
+`dashboard/auth_server.py`의 login 경로와 authentication source를 검사하여 `enforce_failed_login_delay`가 credential 실패 분기에만 호출되고 failure counter·lock state가 없음을 확인한다. `tests/test_dashboard_authentication.py`의 `test_failed_login_delay_waits_only_for_remaining_minimum_duration` 및 `test_failed_login_delay_does_not_sleep_after_minimum_duration`, 그리고 `tests/test_dashboard_auth_server.py::test_successful_login_sets_hardened_24_hour_cookie`를 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: unit/integration/static
+- 백엔드: pytest, source inspection
+- 케이스: 정상 credential, 실패 지연 helper, 반복 실패 후 재시도
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+애플리케이션 failure counter와 lock state를 유지하지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.05-AC01 — Absolute TTL과 고정 subject
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+기본 24시간과 remember-me 30일 token의 `iat`, `exp`, `sub=dashboard-admin`이 고정된다.
+
+**검증**
+
+token claim, TTL, rerun/non-sliding 테스트를 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: unit/integration
+- 백엔드: pytest
+- 케이스: normal, remember-me, activity, reconnect
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+복원은 token을 갱신하지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.06-AC01 — Hardened cookie
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+발급 cookie가 이름·Secure·HttpOnly·SameSite·Path·Domain 계약을 모두 만족한다.
+
+**검증**
+
+실제 HTTP `Set-Cookie`를 파싱하고 속성을 검사한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: integration
+- 백엔드: Starlette TestClient와 loopback HTTPS
+- 케이스: login normal/remember
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+Domain attribute가 없고 평문 전송에서 발급되지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.07-AC01 — Invalid cookie cleanup
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+invalid/expired/tampered/config-failure cookie는 보호 자원 전에 거부되고 same-origin cleanup route의 matching deletion 후 unauthenticated page가 표시된다.
+
+**검증**
+
+실제 browser/HTTP 흐름에서 각 invalid cookie와 cleanup response를 확인한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: integration/browser
+- 백엔드: HTTPS probe와 Streamlit browser evidence
+- 케이스: malformed, expired, tampered, wrong claims, config failure
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+cleanup은 DB를 변경하지 않으며 stale cookie가 남지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.08-AC01 — Explicit logout
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+logout POST가 matching `Max-Age=0` deletion을 반환하고 다음 접근이 unauthenticated다.
+
+**검증**
+
+login 후 logout response와 fresh request를 확인한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: integration/browser
+- 백엔드: HTTPS probe
+- 케이스: same-origin logout, cross-origin rejection
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+금융 DB와 token registry는 변경되지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.09-AC01 — Rotation과 무상태성
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+configured credential 변경은 기존 token을 거부하며 per-token revocation/DB session 구현이 없다.
+
+**검증**
+
+rotation 테스트와 source/schema/diff 검색을 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: unit/static
+- 백엔드: pytest와 repository search
+- 케이스: password, signing secret, admin ID rotation
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+검증은 현재 설정과 서명만 사용한다.
+
+### REQ-001.10-AC01 — 운영 제약
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+README와 Kubernetes 문서에 HTTPS, proxy allowlist, rate limit, secret 주입, rotation과 stateless logout이 기록된다.
+
+**검증**
+
+문서 검색과 deployment manifest 검토를 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: documentation/static
+- 백엔드: repository search
+- 케이스: README, deploy/k8s/README.md
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+실제 credential·secret 값이 문서와 manifest에 없다.
+
+### REQ-001.10-AC02 — 인증 후 기존 페이지 호환성
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+유효한 Dashboard 인증 cookie로 인증하면 기존 page query parameter를 유지한 채 요약, 자산/마감, 분류 규칙, 확인필요 큐와 월정산 핵심 페이지가 예외 없이 예상 내용을 렌더링한다.
+
+**검증**
+
+`tests/test_dashboard_app.py::test_streamlit_apptest_core_pages_use_synthetic_fixture_db`와 `tests/test_dashboard_authentication_app.py::test_valid_cookie_allows_dashboard_and_is_not_stored_in_session_state`를 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: regression integration
+- 백엔드: Streamlit AppTest, synthetic SQLite
+- 케이스: 인증된 핵심 page query와 기존 gateway
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+기존 SQLite schema, page query와 gateway contract를 변경하지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.10-AC03 — MCP 인증 범위 분리
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+Dashboard cookie 인증은 MCP endpoint의 인증을 의미하지 않으며 MCP server 진입점, transport와 port를 변경하지 않는다.
+
+**검증**
+
+Base-to-head diff에서 MCP 인증·진입점·transport·port를 담당하는 `jarca_ledger_mcp/server.py`, `jarca_ledger_mcp/adapters/mcp/**`, `tests/test_mcp_http_runtime.py`의 불변성을 확인하고 기존 stdio, streamable HTTP와 invalid transport 회귀 test를 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: static/regression
+- 백엔드: Git diff, pytest
+- 케이스: MCP source, stdio, streamable HTTP, invalid transport
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+Dashboard와 MCP 인증 경계를 결합하지 않으며 MCP 인증 상태를 변경하지 않는다.
+
+### REQ-001.11-AC01 — 안전한 관찰성
+
+**판정 기준**
+
+허용 event와 correlation ID만 기록되고 민감 값·구체적 검증 원인은 기록되지 않는다.
+
+**검증**
+
+로그 테스트와 redaction 검색을 실행한다.
+
+**검증 분류**
+
+- 수준: unit/static
+- 백엔드: pytest와 repository search
+- 케이스: config, login, cleanup, logout success/failure
+
+**상태 불변조건**
+
+로그에서 credential·secret·token·cookie가 복원되지 않는다.
+
+## 8. 오류 및 충돌 계약
+
+동일 요청에서 설정 오류가 credential 오류보다 우선하며, 모든 인증 실패는 보호 자원 전에 종료된다. invalid cookie는 cleanup deletion을 시도하고, cleanup route가 거부되거나 실패해도 보호 자원은 열지 않는다. cross-origin/plain HTTP 요청은 403, malformed request는 400이다. 동시 login은 application lock 없이 독립 처리한다.
+
+## 9. 데이터 및 인터페이스 계약
+
+Token은 `v`, `sub=dashboard-admin`, `iat`, `exp`, `jti`와 서명만 가지며 browser cookie에만 저장된다. 세 환경변수는 server process에서만 읽는다. 상세 HTTP, cookie, cleanup, logout 계약은 `docs/interface-contract.md`에 정의한다.
+
+## 10. 하위 호환성
+
+Issue #1의 Dashboard-only 범위, 기존 page/query/gateway/MCP 동작과 구현 PR #3의 추적성을 유지한다. session-only 인증은 persistent cookie로 대체하며 SQLite schema와 MCP transport는 변경하지 않는다.
+
+## 11. 추적성
+
+- 근거 이슈: `#1`, `#6`
+- 구현 PR: `#3`, `#7`
+- 관련 설계 문서: `docs/interface-contract.md`, `docs/project-structure.md`, `docs/runtime-flow.md`, `README.md`, `deploy/k8s/README.md`
+- 관련 요구사항: 없음
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# Runtime Flow — Dashboard 관리자 인증
+
+## 목적과 범위
+
+ASGI startup부터 login, token restoration, invalid-cookie cleanup, explicit logout까지의 실행 순서와 상태 계약을 정의한다.
+
+- 포함 범위: config, HTTPS routes, cookie verification, Streamlit gate, cleanup/deletion
+- 제외 범위: MCP request authentication, DB session/token registry, per-token revocation
+- 시작 조건: trusted ASGI process receives request
+- 성공 종료 상태: authenticated Dashboard page executes
+- 실패 종료 상태: matching cookie deletion and unauthenticated login page
+
+## 흐름
+
+### startup — ASGI startup
+
+- 시작 이벤트: process startup
+- 선행조건: deployment injects configuration without recording values
+- 실행 방식: synchronous startup/request handling
+- 트랜잭션·영속성 경계: no auth persistence; existing financial SQLite is untouched
+
+| 단계 ID | 실행 주체 | 시작 조건·입력 | 처리 | 읽기·쓰기 상태 | 외부 호출 | 성공 시 다음 단계 | 실패 시 전이 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `startup-01` | Uvicorn | process command | load `dashboard.server:app` | process memory only | none | `startup-02` | `startup-fail` |
+| `startup-02` | ASGI app | app loaded | mount auth routes and Streamlit runtime | route table only | none | `gate-01` | `startup-fail` |
+
+### login — Credential login
+
+- 시작 이벤트: same-origin HTTPS form POST
+- 선행조건: valid trusted scheme, origin and bounded body
+- 실행 방식: synchronous request
+- 트랜잭션·영속성 경계: no DB transaction; cookie is browser state
+
+| 단계 ID | 실행 주체 | 시작 조건·입력 | 처리 | 읽기·쓰기 상태 | 외부 호출 | 성공 시 다음 단계 | 실패 시 전이 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `login-01` | auth server | POST `/api/auth/login` | validate scheme/origin/body | request only | none | `login-02` | `login-reject` |
+| `login-02` | authentication | validated form | load three settings, fail closed | server memory | secret provider/environment | `login-03` | `config-fail` |
+| `login-03` | authentication | configured settings | constant-time compare ID/password | no persistent write | none | `login-04` | `login-fail` |
+| `login-04` | authentication | valid credential | issue exactly `v`, `sub=dashboard-admin`, `iat`, `exp`, `jti`; fix `iat`/`exp` at login success for default 24 hours or `remember_me=on` 30 days | server memory | none | `login-05` | `login-fail` |
+| `login-05` | auth server | signed token | set hardened cookie with selected absolute expiry and redirect; later activity never reissues or extends it | browser cookie write | response | `gate-01` | `login-fail` |
+
+### restore — Existing cookie restoration
+
+- 시작 이벤트: new request/session with browser cookie
+- 선행조건: cookie present or absent; current configuration available
+- 실행 방식: synchronous gate
+- 트랜잭션·영속성 경계: no server-side session; financial DB begins only after gate success
+
+| 단계 ID | 실행 주체 | 시작 조건·입력 | 처리 | 읽기·쓰기 상태 | 외부 호출 | 성공 시 다음 단계 | 실패 시 전이 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `gate-01` | dashboard app | page startup | call authentication before DB path/page dispatch | no DB access | none | `gate-02` | `unauthenticated` |
+| `gate-02` | authentication | current config and cookie | verify signature, exact `v`/`sub=dashboard-admin`/`iat`/`exp`/`jti` claims, current admin-ID/password/signing-secret binding and absolute `exp`; never refresh or extend on restoration, rerun or activity | no session or token write | none | `dashboard-01` | `cleanup-01` |
+| `dashboard-01` | dashboard app | accepted token | resolve DB path and dispatch requested page | existing SQLite reads/writes | gateway/page code | `authenticated` | `dashboard-fail` |
+
+### cleanup — Invalid cookie cleanup
+
+- 시작 이벤트: gate rejects malformed, expired, tampered, claim-invalid, or config-failure cookie
+- 선행조건: same-origin HTTPS cleanup request
+- 실행 방식: synchronous request
+- 트랜잭션·영속성 경계: no DB or token registry write
+
+| 단계 ID | 실행 주체 | 시작 조건·입력 | 처리 | 읽기·쓰기 상태 | 외부 호출 | 성공 시 다음 단계 | 실패 시 전이 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `cleanup-01` | browser/auth gate | invalid cookie | navigate to `GET /api/auth/cleanup` | request only | auth route | `cleanup-02` | `cleanup-reject` |
+| `cleanup-02` | auth server | same-origin HTTPS `Referer` | emit matching deletion (`Max-Age=0`) and root redirect | browser cookie deletion | response | `unauthenticated` | `cleanup-reject` |
+
+### logout — Explicit logout
+
+- 시작 이벤트: user submits logout form
+- 선행조건: same-origin HTTPS POST
+- 실행 방식: synchronous request
+- 트랜잭션·영속성 경계: no financial DB change and no per-token revocation
+
+| 단계 ID | 실행 주체 | 시작 조건·입력 | 처리 | 읽기·쓰기 상태 | 외부 호출 | 성공 시 다음 단계 | 실패 시 전이 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `logout-01` | browser | POST `/api/auth/logout` | validate same-origin HTTPS | request only | none | `logout-02` | `logout-reject` |
+| `logout-02` | auth server | validated request | matching deletion and root redirect | browser cookie deletion | response | `unauthenticated` | `logout-reject` |
+
+## 실패와 복구
+
+| 대상 단계 | 실패 조건 | 추가 쓰기 중단 | 재시도 계약 | 중복 방지 | 보상·수동 복구 | 최종 상태 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `login-02` | missing/empty/read-error/short secret | yes | fix deployment config | no cookie | operator injects secret | `config-fail` |
+| `login-03` | wrong ID/password | yes | retry after generic error and 1s delay | no lock | external rate limit | `login-fail` |
+| `gate-02` | expired, malformed/tampered claims, or admin-ID/password/signing-secret rotation failure | yes | cleanup then login | matching deletion | user logs in again | `unauthenticated` |
+| `cleanup-02` | non-HTTPS/cross-origin | yes | retry same origin | deletion is idempotent | browser clears manually if needed | `cleanup-reject` |
+| `logout-02` | non-HTTPS/cross-origin | yes | retry same origin | deletion is idempotent | browser clears manually if needed | `logout-reject` |
+
+### 동시성과 순서
+
+- 동시 실행 허용 여부: independent requests allowed; no application-wide auth lock
+- 잠금·직렬화 단위: none for authentication; existing SQLite rules remain for financial writes
+- 순서 보장: config/cookie gate precedes DB path, gateway and page dispatch
+- 충돌 검출·처리: token is stateless; password/signing-secret/admin-ID rotation invalidates old claims
+- 만료 불변조건: login 성공 시 고정한 `iat`와 `exp`는 복원·rerun·활동 동안 바뀌지 않으며 token을 재발급하거나 만료를 연장하지 않음
+- rotation 불변조건: admin ID, password 또는 signing secret 변경은 이전 설정으로 발급한 모든 token을 무효화하고 `cleanup-01`로 전이
+
+## 관찰 가능성
+
+| 신호 종류 | 이름 | 발생 단계·조건 | 상관 식별자 | 진단 속성 | 민감정보 처리 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| event log | `authentication_required` | `gate-01` rejects | non-sensitive correlation ID | event class only | no cookie/token/reason |
+| event log | `login_succeeded` | `login-05` | non-sensitive correlation ID | TTL class only | no credential/token |
+| event log | `login_failed` | `login-03` | non-sensitive correlation ID | generic failure class | no ID/password |
+| event log | `cleanup` | `cleanup-02` | non-sensitive correlation ID | generic cleanup class | no cookie header |
+| event log | `logout` | `logout-02` | non-sensitive correlation ID | operation result | no token/cookie value |
+
+## 검증
+
+- 정상 흐름: auth server tests plus loopback HTTPS login and fresh session restoration
+- 실패 흐름: configuration, wrong credential, malformed/tampered/expired cookie and origin rejection tests
+- 경계 흐름: TTL boundary, rotation, oversized token, same-host different-port origin
+- 동시성 흐름: independent failed submissions and no application lock; ingress rate-limit configuration review
+- 운영 진입점과 기대 결과: `uvicorn dashboard.server:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8501`; valid HTTPS reaches login or authenticated page, invalid cookie receives matching deletion before unauthenticated page
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """Jarca Ledger MCP server."""

-__version__ = "0.1.0"
+__version__ = "0.1.3"
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"

 [project]
 name = "jarca-ledger-mcp"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.3"
 description = "Jarca household ledger MCP server for transactions, accounts, budgets, cashflow, and investable cashflow analysis"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"
@@ -17,11 +17,14 @@ dependencies = [
 ]

 [project.optional-dependencies]
-dev = ["pytest>=8.0.0", "ruff>=0.6.0"]
+dev = ["pytest>=8.0.0", "ruff>=0.6.0", "websockets>=15.0,<17.0"]
 dashboard = [
-  "pandas>=2.0.0",
-  "plotly>=5.0.0",
-  "streamlit>=1.30.0",
+  "streamlit>=1.58.0,<1.59.0",
+  "plotly>=5.20.0",
+  "pandas>=2.2.0",
+  "itsdangerous>=2.2.0,<3.0",
+  "starlette>=0.40.0,<2.0",
+  "uvicorn>=0.30.0,<1.0",
 ]

 [project.scripts]
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""CI wrapper for the Streamlit dashboard HTTP smoke gate.
+"""CI wrapper for the production Dashboard ASGI HTTP smoke gate.

-Creates a synthetic fixture DB, starts Streamlit against it, waits for HTTP 200,
-and always attempts process cleanup. Output is intentionally status-only.
+Creates a synthetic fixture DB, starts the authenticated Streamlit ASGI wrapper,
+waits for HTTP 200, and always attempts process cleanup. Output is intentionally
+status-only.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations

@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ from scripts.ci_fixture_db import create_ci_fixture_db


 def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run Streamlit dashboard HTTP smoke against a synthetic CI fixture DB.")
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run the Dashboard ASGI HTTP smoke against a synthetic CI fixture DB.")
    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="Loopback host to bind")
    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=18501, help="Deterministic smoke port")
    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=45, help="Readiness timeout in seconds")
@@ -75,21 +76,21 @@ def main() -> int:
            fixture = create_ci_fixture_db(fixture_path)
            env = os.environ.copy()
            env["JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH"] = str(fixture_path)
+            env["JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID"] = "a"
+            env["JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD"] = "p"
+            env["JARCA_DASHBOARD_SIGNING_SECRET"] = "s" * 32
+            env["FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS"] = "127.0.0.1"
            env["STREAMLIT_BROWSER_GATHER_USAGE_STATS"] = "false"
            cmd = [
                sys.executable,
                "-m",
-                "streamlit",
-                "run",
-                "dashboard/app.py",
-                "--server.address",
+                "uvicorn",
+                "dashboard.server:app",
+                "--host",
                args.host,
-                "--server.port",
+                "--port",
                str(args.port),
-                "--server.headless",
-                "true",
-                "--browser.gatherUsageStats",
-                "false",
+                "--proxy-headers",
            ]
            proc = subprocess.Popen(
                cmd,
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Exercise persistent-auth HTTP responses without printing secrets or tokens."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import http.client
+import json
+import os
+import ssl
+from urllib.parse import urlencode, urlsplit
+
+from streamlit.proto.BackMsg_pb2 import BackMsg
+from streamlit.proto.ClientState_pb2 import ClientState
+from streamlit.proto.ForwardMsg_pb2 import ForwardMsg
+from websockets.sync.client import connect
+
+COOKIE_NAME = "__Host-jarca_dashboard_auth"
+
+
+def _args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="https://127.0.0.1:18506")
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def _connection(parsed):
+    if parsed.scheme != "https" or parsed.hostname not in {"127.0.0.1", "localhost"}:
+        raise SystemExit("Evidence target must be loopback HTTPS")
+    context = ssl.create_default_context()
+    context.check_hostname = False
+    context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+    return http.client.HTTPSConnection(parsed.hostname, parsed.port, context=context, timeout=10)
+
+
+def _request(parsed, method: str, path: str, *, body: bytes | None = None, headers=None):
+    connection = _connection(parsed)
+    connection.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers or {})
+    response = connection.getresponse()
+    payload = response.read()
+    result = response.status, {key.lower(): value for key, value in response.getheaders()}, payload
+    connection.close()
+    return result
+
+
+def _assert_streamlit_restore(parsed, cookie_pair: str) -> int:
+    context = ssl.create_default_context()
+    context.check_hostname = False
+    context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+    origin = f"https://{parsed.hostname}:{parsed.port}"
+    websocket_url = f"wss://{parsed.hostname}:{parsed.port}/_stcore/stream"
+    with connect(
+        websocket_url,
+        ssl=context,
+        origin=origin,
+        subprotocols=["streamlit"],
+        additional_headers={"Cookie": cookie_pair},
+        proxy=None,
+        open_timeout=30,
+    ) as websocket:
+        back_message = BackMsg()
+        back_message.rerun_script.CopyFrom(
+            ClientState(query_string="page=%EC%9A%94%EC%95%BD")
+        )
+        websocket.send(back_message.SerializeToString())
+        messages: list[str] = []
+        for _ in range(100):
+            raw = websocket.recv(timeout=15)
+            if isinstance(raw, str):
+                continue
+            forward_message = ForwardMsg()
+            forward_message.ParseFromString(raw)
+            messages.append(str(forward_message))
+            if forward_message.HasField("script_finished"):
+                break
+    combined = "\n".join(messages)
+    if "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" not in combined or "관리자 로그인" in combined:
+        raise SystemExit("Signed cookie did not restore the authenticated Streamlit page")
+    return len(messages)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    parsed = urlsplit(_args().base_url)
+    admin_id = os.environ["JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID"]
+    password = os.environ["JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD"]
+    origin = f"https://{parsed.hostname}:{parsed.port}"
+
+    body = urlencode(
+        {"admin_id": admin_id, "admin_password": password, "remember_me": "on"}
+    ).encode()
+    status, headers, _ = _request(
+        parsed,
+        "POST",
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        body=body,
+        headers={
+            "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+            "Content-Length": str(len(body)),
+            "Origin": origin,
+        },
+    )
+    cookie_header = headers.get("set-cookie", "")
+    required = [COOKIE_NAME + "=", "HttpOnly", "Secure", "SameSite=lax", "Path=/", "Max-Age=2592000"]
+    if status != 303 or headers.get("location") != "/" or not all(
+        marker in cookie_header for marker in required
+    ):
+        raise SystemExit("Login response did not satisfy the hardened cookie contract")
+    cookie_pair = cookie_header.split(";", 1)[0]
+
+    status, _, _ = _request(
+        parsed,
+        "GET",
+        "/",
+        headers={"Cookie": cookie_pair},
+    )
+    if status != 200:
+        raise SystemExit("Authenticated reconnect request failed")
+    websocket_messages = _assert_streamlit_restore(parsed, cookie_pair)
+
+    status, headers, _ = _request(
+        parsed,
+        "POST",
+        "/api/auth/logout",
+        headers={"Origin": origin, "Cookie": cookie_pair, "Content-Length": "0"},
+    )
+    deletion = headers.get("set-cookie", "")
+    if status != 303 or not all(
+        marker in deletion
+        for marker in [COOKIE_NAME + "=", "HttpOnly", "Secure", "SameSite=lax", "Path=/", "Max-Age=0"]
+    ):
+        raise SystemExit("Logout response did not satisfy the cookie deletion contract")
+
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "success": True,
+                "transport": "loopback HTTPS",
+                "login_status": 303,
+                "reconnect_status": 200,
+                "streamlit_websocket_authenticated": True,
+                "streamlit_messages": websocket_messages,
+                "logout_status": 303,
+                "cookie_name": COOKIE_NAME,
+                "cookie_value": "[REDACTED]",
+                "remember_me_max_age": 2592000,
+            },
+            indent=2,
+        )
+    )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from streamlit.testing.v1 import AppTest
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))

 from dashboard.app import get_transfer_review_items
+from dashboard import authentication
 from scripts.ci_fixture_db import create_ci_fixture_db


@@ -43,6 +44,13 @@ def test_streamlit_apptest_core_pages_use_synthetic_fixture_db(tmp_path, monkeyp
    fixture = tmp_path / "fixture.sqlite3"
    create_ci_fixture_db(fixture)
    monkeypatch.setenv("JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH", str(fixture))
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, "test-admin")
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, "test-password")
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, "s" * 64)
+    settings = authentication.load_auth_settings()
+    assert settings is not None
+    token = authentication.issue_persistent_token(settings, remember_me=False).value
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "_request_cookie", lambda: token)

    app_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "dashboard" / "app.py"
    page_expectations = {
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import sys
+import threading
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from http.cookies import SimpleCookie
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.requests import Request
+
+ROOT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+if str(ROOT_DIR) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT_DIR))
+
+from dashboard import authentication
+from dashboard.auth_server import create_auth_routes, login
+
+
+ADMIN_ID = "admin"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple"
+SIGNING_SECRET = "s" * 64
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _configured_auth(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, ADMIN_ID)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, ADMIN_PASSWORD)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, SIGNING_SECRET)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication.time, "sleep", lambda _seconds: None)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client() -> TestClient:
+    from starlette.applications import Starlette
+
+    return TestClient(
+        Starlette(routes=create_auth_routes()), base_url="https://testserver"
+    )
+
+
+def _cookie_from(response) -> SimpleCookie[str]:
+    cookie: SimpleCookie[str] = SimpleCookie()
+    cookie.load(response.headers["set-cookie"])
+    return cookie
+
+
+def test_successful_login_sets_hardened_24_hour_cookie(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert response.headers["location"] == "/"
+    header = response.headers["set-cookie"]
+    assert f"{authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME}=" in header
+    assert "HttpOnly" in header
+    assert "Secure" in header
+    assert "SameSite=lax" in header
+    assert "Path=/" in header
+    assert f"Max-Age={authentication.DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS}" in header
+    assert ADMIN_PASSWORD not in header
+    assert SIGNING_SECRET not in header
+
+
+def test_remember_me_sets_30_day_cookie(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={
+            "admin_id": ADMIN_ID,
+            "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD,
+            "remember_me": "on",
+        },
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert (
+        f"Max-Age={authentication.REMEMBER_ME_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS}"
+        in response.headers["set-cookie"]
+    )
+
+
+def test_unicode_credentials_can_login_through_adapter(client: TestClient, monkeypatch) -> None:
+    unicode_id = "管理员"
+    unicode_password = "päss🔐"
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, unicode_id)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, unicode_password)
+
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": unicode_id, "admin_password": unicode_password},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert response.headers["location"] == "/"
+    assert f"{authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME}=" in response.headers["set-cookie"]
+
+
+def test_unicode_credential_mismatch_is_generic_and_delayed(
+    client: TestClient, monkeypatch
+) -> None:
+    import time as real_time
+
+    unicode_id = "管理员"
+    unicode_password = "päss🔐"
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, unicode_id)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, unicode_password)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication.time, "sleep", real_time.sleep)
+
+    started = real_time.monotonic()
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": unicode_id, "admin_password": "неверный🔒"},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+    elapsed = real_time.monotonic() - started
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert response.headers["location"] == "/?auth_error=invalid"
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+    assert elapsed >= authentication.MINIMUM_FAILURE_DELAY_SECONDS * 0.9
+
+
+def test_invalid_credentials_do_not_set_cookie_and_use_general_error(
+    client: TestClient,
+) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": "wrong"},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert response.headers["location"] == "/?auth_error=invalid"
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+    assert "password" not in response.headers["location"]
+    assert ADMIN_ID not in response.headers["location"]
+
+
+def test_login_rejects_malformed_percent_encoded_utf8_without_cookie(
+    client: TestClient,
+) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        content=b"admin_id=%FF&admin_password=wrong",
+        headers={
+            "origin": "https://testserver",
+            "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+        },
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_missing_configuration_fails_closed(client: TestClient, monkeypatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.delenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV)
+
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert response.headers["location"] == "/?auth_error=unavailable"
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_cross_site_login_is_rejected(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        headers={"origin": "https://attacker.example"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_different_port_is_not_same_origin(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver:444"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_plain_http_is_rejected_even_with_spoofed_https_origin() -> None:
+    from starlette.applications import Starlette
+
+    with TestClient(
+        Starlette(routes=create_auth_routes()), base_url="http://testserver"
+    ) as http_client:
+        response = http_client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login",
+            data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+            headers={
+                "origin": "https://testserver",
+                "x-forwarded-proto": "https",
+            },
+            follow_redirects=False,
+        )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_logout_clears_cookie_with_matching_scope(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/logout",
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    header = response.headers["set-cookie"]
+    assert f"{authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME}=" in header
+    assert "Max-Age=0" in header
+    assert "HttpOnly" in header
+    assert "Secure" in header
+    assert "SameSite=lax" in header
+    assert "Path=/" in header
+
+
+def test_cleanup_route_clears_cookie_and_redirects(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.get(
+        "/api/auth/cleanup",
+        headers={"referer": "https://testserver/"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert response.headers["location"] == "/"
+    header = response.headers["set-cookie"]
+    assert f"{authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME}=" in header
+    assert "Max-Age=0" in header
+    assert "HttpOnly" in header
+    assert "Secure" in header
+    assert "SameSite=lax" in header
+    assert "Path=/" in header
+
+
+def test_cleanup_route_rejects_cross_origin_navigation(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.get(
+        "/api/auth/cleanup",
+        headers={"referer": "https://attacker.example/"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+
+def test_cookie_token_round_trip(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        data={"admin_id": ADMIN_ID, "admin_password": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        headers={"origin": "https://testserver"},
+        follow_redirects=False,
+    )
+    cookie = _cookie_from(response)
+    token = cookie[authentication.AUTH_COOKIE_NAME].value
+
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        authentication.load_auth_settings(), token
+    ) is not None
+
+
+def _streaming_login_request(
+    chunks: list[bytes],
+) -> tuple[Request, Callable[[], int]]:
+    messages = [
+        {
+            "type": "http.request",
+            "body": chunk,
+            "more_body": index < len(chunks) - 1,
+        }
+        for index, chunk in enumerate(chunks)
+    ]
+    calls = 0
+
+    async def receive():
+        nonlocal calls
+        calls += 1
+        return messages.pop(0)
+
+    scope = {
+        "type": "http",
+        "method": "POST",
+        "scheme": "https",
+        "path": "/api/auth/login",
+        "raw_path": b"/api/auth/login",
+        "query_string": b"",
+        "headers": [
+            (b"host", b"testserver"),
+            (b"origin", b"https://testserver"),
+            (b"content-type", b"application/x-www-form-urlencoded"),
+        ],
+        "client": ("testclient", 50000),
+        "server": ("testserver", 443),
+    }
+    return Request(scope, receive), lambda: calls
+
+
+def test_login_offloads_failed_login_delay_from_event_loop(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    entered = threading.Event()
+    release = threading.Event()
+    probe_ran = threading.Event()
+    probe_before_release = threading.Event()
+
+    def blocking_delay(*, started_at):
+        entered.set()
+        if probe_ran.wait(timeout=1):
+            probe_before_release.set()
+        release.set()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "enforce_failed_login_delay", blocking_delay)
+
+    async def exercise() -> None:
+        request, _ = _streaming_login_request([b"admin_id=admin&admin_password=wrong"])
+        task = asyncio.create_task(login(request))
+
+        async def probe() -> None:
+            probe_ran.set()
+
+        asyncio.create_task(probe())
+        assert await asyncio.to_thread(entered.wait, 1)
+        release.set()
+        response = await task
+        assert response.status_code == 303
+        assert response.headers["location"] == "/?auth_error=invalid"
+        assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+
+    asyncio.run(exercise())
+    assert probe_before_release.is_set()
+
+
+def test_login_rejects_exactly_one_byte_over_streaming_limit(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    def unexpected_verification(*_args, **_kwargs):
+        raise AssertionError("oversized body reached credential verification")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "verify_credentials", unexpected_verification)
+    request, calls = _streaming_login_request([b"x" * 4097])
+    response = asyncio.run(login(request))
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert "set-cookie" not in response.headers
+    assert calls() == 1
+
+
+def test_login_accepts_body_at_streaming_limit() -> None:
+    prefix = b"admin_id=admin&admin_password="
+    body = prefix + (b"x" * (4096 - len(prefix)))
+    assert len(body) == 4096
+    request, calls = _streaming_login_request([body])
+    response = asyncio.run(login(request))
+
+    assert response.status_code == 303
+    assert calls() == 1
+
+
+def test_login_stops_reading_stream_after_limit_is_exceeded() -> None:
+    request, calls = _streaming_login_request([b"x" * 4096, b"y", b"z"])
+    response = asyncio.run(login(request))
+
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert calls() == 2
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
+
+from dashboard import authentication
+
+
+ADMIN_ID = "test-admin"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD = "test-password"
+
+
+def test_load_admin_credentials_uses_only_required_environment_variables():
+    credentials = authentication.load_admin_credentials(
+        {
+            "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID": ADMIN_ID,
+            "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD": ADMIN_PASSWORD,
+            "auth.admin_id": "ignored-streamlit-id",
+            "auth.admin_password": "ignored-streamlit-password",
+        }
+    )
+
+    assert credentials.admin_id == ADMIN_ID
+    assert credentials.password == ADMIN_PASSWORD
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "environ",
+    [
+        {},
+        {"JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID": ADMIN_ID},
+        {"JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        {"JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID": "", "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        {"JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID": ADMIN_ID, "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD": ""},
+        {"JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID": 123, "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD": ADMIN_PASSWORD},
+        {"JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_ID": ADMIN_ID, "JARCA_DASHBOARD_ADMIN_PASSWORD": object()},
+    ],
+)
+def test_load_admin_credentials_fails_closed_for_missing_empty_or_nonstring_values(environ):
+    with pytest.raises(authentication.AuthenticationConfigurationError) as exc_info:
+        authentication.load_admin_credentials(environ)
+
+    assert str(exc_info.value) == authentication.CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE
+    assert ADMIN_ID not in str(exc_info.value)
+    assert ADMIN_PASSWORD not in str(exc_info.value)
+
+
+def test_load_admin_credentials_fails_closed_when_environment_cannot_be_read():
+    class UnreadableEnvironment:
+        def get(self, key):
+            raise OSError("secret backend unavailable")
+
+    with pytest.raises(authentication.AuthenticationConfigurationError) as exc_info:
+        authentication.load_admin_credentials(UnreadableEnvironment())
+
+    assert str(exc_info.value) == authentication.CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE
+    assert "secret backend" not in str(exc_info.value)
+
+
+def test_verify_credentials_uses_constant_time_comparison_for_both_fields(monkeypatch):
+    credentials = authentication.AdminCredentials(ADMIN_ID, ADMIN_PASSWORD)
+    comparisons: list[tuple[bytes, bytes]] = []
+
+    def record_compare(left: bytes, right: bytes) -> bool:
+        comparisons.append((left, right))
+        return left == right
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication.hmac, "compare_digest", record_compare)
+
+    assert authentication.verify_credentials(credentials, ADMIN_ID, ADMIN_PASSWORD) is True
+    assert comparisons == [
+        (ADMIN_ID.encode("utf-8"), ADMIN_ID.encode("utf-8")),
+        (ADMIN_PASSWORD.encode("utf-8"), ADMIN_PASSWORD.encode("utf-8")),
+    ]
+
+    comparisons.clear()
+    assert authentication.verify_credentials(credentials, "wrong-id", "wrong-password") is False
+    assert comparisons == [
+        (b"wrong-id", ADMIN_ID.encode("utf-8")),
+        (b"wrong-password", ADMIN_PASSWORD.encode("utf-8")),
+    ]
+
+
+def test_failed_login_delay_waits_only_for_remaining_minimum_duration():
+    sleeps: list[float] = []
+
+    authentication.enforce_failed_login_delay(
+        started_at=10.0,
+        minimum_seconds=1.0,
+        monotonic=lambda: 10.25,
+        sleep=sleeps.append,
+    )
+
+    assert sleeps == [pytest.approx(0.75)]
+
+
+def test_failed_login_delay_does_not_sleep_after_minimum_duration():
+    sleeps: list[float] = []
+
+    authentication.enforce_failed_login_delay(
+        started_at=10.0,
+        minimum_seconds=1.0,
+        monotonic=lambda: 11.25,
+        sleep=sleeps.append,
+    )
+
+    assert sleeps == []
+
+
+def test_authentication_correlation_id_is_noncredential_session_state():
+    session_state: dict[str, object] = {}
+
+    correlation_id = authentication.get_auth_correlation_id(session_state, token_hex=lambda size: "safe-correlation")
+
+    assert correlation_id == "safe-correlation"
+    assert session_state == {authentication.AUTH_CORRELATION_SESSION_KEY: "safe-correlation"}
+
+
+def test_authentication_event_log_contains_only_event_and_correlation(monkeypatch):
+    calls: list[tuple[str, tuple[object, ...]]] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication.logger, "info", lambda message, *args: calls.append((message, args)))
+
+    authentication.log_auth_event("login_failed", "safe-correlation")
+
+    assert calls == [("dashboard_auth event=%s correlation_id=%s", ("login_failed", "safe-correlation"))]
+    assert ADMIN_ID not in repr(calls)
+    assert ADMIN_PASSWORD not in repr(calls)
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import sys
+
+from streamlit.testing.v1 import AppTest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
+
+from dashboard import authentication
+
+
+ADMIN_ID = "test-admin"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD = "test-password"
+SIGNING_SECRET = "s" * 64
+APP_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "dashboard" / "app.py"
+
+
+def _body_text(at: AppTest) -> str:
+    elements = (
+        list(at.title)
+        + list(at.header)
+        + list(at.subheader)
+        + list(at.text)
+        + list(at.markdown)
+        + list(at.caption)
+        + list(at.error)
+    )
+    return "\n".join(str(item.value) for item in elements)
+
+
+def _configure(monkeypatch) -> authentication.AuthSettings:
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, ADMIN_ID)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, ADMIN_PASSWORD)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, SIGNING_SECRET)
+    settings = authentication.load_auth_settings()
+    assert settings is not None
+    return settings
+
+
+def _app_with_cookie(monkeypatch, token: str | None, *, page: str = "요약") -> AppTest:
+    _configure(monkeypatch)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "_request_cookie", lambda: token)
+    at = AppTest.from_file(str(APP_PATH), default_timeout=30)
+    at.query_params["page"] = page
+    return at.run()
+
+
+def test_missing_authentication_configuration_fails_closed(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    from scripts.ci_fixture_db import create_ci_fixture_db
+
+    fixture = tmp_path / "fixture.sqlite3"
+    create_ci_fixture_db(fixture)
+    monkeypatch.delenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH", str(fixture))
+
+    at = AppTest.from_file(str(APP_PATH), default_timeout=30).run()
+
+    assert not at.exception
+    assert "관리자 로그인" in _body_text(at)
+    assert authentication.CONFIGURATION_ERROR_MESSAGE in _body_text(at)
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" not in _body_text(at)
+
+
+def test_main_does_not_resolve_database_or_dispatch_when_authentication_rejects(
+    monkeypatch,
+):
+    from dashboard import app
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(app, "require_dashboard_authentication", lambda: False)
+
+    def forbidden_database_access():
+        raise AssertionError("get_db_path must not run before authentication")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(app, "get_db_path", forbidden_database_access)
+
+    app.main()
+
+
+def test_query_parameter_cannot_bypass_login_or_reach_import_page(monkeypatch):
+    at = _app_with_cookie(monkeypatch, None, page="Import")
+
+    assert not at.exception
+    assert "관리자 로그인" in _body_text(at)
+    assert "PDF Import" not in _body_text(at)
+    assert "Import 이력" not in _body_text(at)
+
+
+def test_login_form_posts_credentials_to_server_side_adapter(monkeypatch):
+    at = _app_with_cookie(monkeypatch, None)
+    body = _body_text(at)
+
+    assert 'action="/api/auth/login"' in body
+    assert 'method="post"' in body
+    assert 'name="admin_id"' in body
+    assert 'name="admin_password"' in body
+    assert 'name="remember_me"' in body
+    assert ADMIN_ID not in repr(at.session_state)
+    assert ADMIN_PASSWORD not in repr(at.session_state)
+    assert SIGNING_SECRET not in repr(at.session_state)
+
+
+def test_invalid_cookie_blocks_database_and_page_dispatch(monkeypatch):
+    at = _app_with_cookie(monkeypatch, "malformed-token")
+
+    assert not at.exception
+    assert "관리자 로그인" in _body_text(at)
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" not in _body_text(at)
+    assert "/api/auth/cleanup" in _body_text(at)
+
+
+def test_no_cookie_does_not_render_cookie_cleanup_navigation(monkeypatch):
+    at = _app_with_cookie(monkeypatch, None)
+
+    assert "/api/auth/cleanup" not in _body_text(at)
+
+
+def test_valid_cookie_allows_dashboard_and_is_not_stored_in_session_state(
+    monkeypatch, tmp_path
+):
+    from scripts.ci_fixture_db import create_ci_fixture_db
+
+    fixture = tmp_path / "fixture.sqlite3"
+    create_ci_fixture_db(fixture)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH", str(fixture))
+    settings = _configure(monkeypatch)
+    token = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings, remember_me=False, now=1_700_000_000
+    ).value
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication.time, "time", lambda: 1_700_000_001)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "_request_cookie", lambda: token)
+
+    at = AppTest.from_file(str(APP_PATH), default_timeout=30).run()
+
+    assert not at.exception
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" in _body_text(at)
+    assert 'action="/api/auth/logout"' in _body_text(at)
+    assert token not in repr(at.session_state)
+    assert ADMIN_PASSWORD not in repr(at.session_state)
+    assert SIGNING_SECRET not in repr(at.session_state)
+
+
+def test_password_rotation_invalidates_existing_cookie(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    from scripts.ci_fixture_db import create_ci_fixture_db
+
+    fixture = tmp_path / "fixture.sqlite3"
+    create_ci_fixture_db(fixture)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH", str(fixture))
+    settings = _configure(monkeypatch)
+    token = authentication.issue_persistent_token(settings, remember_me=True).value
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "_request_cookie", lambda: token)
+
+    at = AppTest.from_file(str(APP_PATH), default_timeout=30).run()
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" in _body_text(at)
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, "rotated-password")
+    at = at.run()
+
+    assert "관리자 로그인" in _body_text(at)
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" not in _body_text(at)
+
+
+def test_signing_secret_rotation_invalidates_existing_cookie(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    from scripts.ci_fixture_db import create_ci_fixture_db
+
+    fixture = tmp_path / "fixture.sqlite3"
+    create_ci_fixture_db(fixture)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("JARCA_LEDGER_DB_PATH", str(fixture))
+    settings = _configure(monkeypatch)
+    token = authentication.issue_persistent_token(settings, remember_me=True).value
+    monkeypatch.setattr(authentication, "_request_cookie", lambda: token)
+
+    at = AppTest.from_file(str(APP_PATH), default_timeout=30).run()
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" in _body_text(at)
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, "r" * 64)
+    at = at.run()
+
+    assert "관리자 로그인" in _body_text(at)
+    assert "/api/auth/cleanup" in _body_text(at)
+    assert "이번 달 수입/지출 현황" not in _body_text(at)
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+from dataclasses import replace
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+if str(ROOT_DIR) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT_DIR))
+
+from dashboard import authentication
+
+
+ADMIN_ID = "admin"
+ADMIN_PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple"
+SIGNING_SECRET = "s" * 64
+
+
+def _settings() -> authentication.AuthSettings:
+    return authentication.AuthSettings(
+        admin_id=ADMIN_ID,
+        admin_password=ADMIN_PASSWORD,
+        signing_secret=SIGNING_SECRET,
+    )
+
+
+def test_load_auth_settings_requires_signing_secret(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_ID_ENV, ADMIN_ID)
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.ADMIN_PASSWORD_ENV, ADMIN_PASSWORD)
+    monkeypatch.delenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, raising=False)
+
+    assert authentication.load_auth_settings() is None
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv(authentication.SIGNING_SECRET_ENV, SIGNING_SECRET)
+    assert authentication.load_auth_settings() == _settings()
+
+
+def test_issue_and_verify_default_token_without_refresh() -> None:
+    settings = _settings()
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings,
+        remember_me=False,
+        now=1_700_000_000,
+        token_id="fixed-token-id",
+    )
+
+    verified = authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        settings,
+        issued.value,
+        now=1_700_000_001,
+    )
+
+    assert verified is not None
+    assert verified.issued_at == 1_700_000_000
+    assert verified.expires_at == 1_700_086_400
+    assert issued.max_age == authentication.DEFAULT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS
+    assert verified.token_id == "fixed-token-id"
+    assert ADMIN_PASSWORD not in issued.value
+    assert SIGNING_SECRET not in issued.value
+
+
+def test_remember_me_token_uses_30_day_absolute_expiry() -> None:
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        _settings(),
+        remember_me=True,
+        now=1_700_000_000,
+        token_id="fixed-token-id",
+    )
+
+    assert issued.expires_at == 1_702_592_000
+    assert issued.max_age == authentication.REMEMBER_ME_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS
+
+
+def test_token_expiry_is_absolute_and_not_sliding() -> None:
+    settings = _settings()
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings,
+        remember_me=False,
+        now=1_700_000_000,
+        token_id="fixed-token-id",
+    )
+
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        settings, issued.value, now=issued.expires_at - 1
+    ) is not None
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        settings, issued.value, now=issued.expires_at
+    ) is None
+
+
+def test_tampering_and_rotations_invalidate_token() -> None:
+    settings = _settings()
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings,
+        remember_me=True,
+        now=1_700_000_000,
+        token_id="fixed-token-id",
+    )
+    replacement = "A" if issued.value[-1] != "A" else "B"
+    tampered = issued.value[:-1] + replacement
+
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        settings, tampered, now=1_700_000_001
+    ) is None
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        replace(settings, signing_secret="n" * 64),
+        issued.value,
+        now=1_700_000_001,
+    ) is None
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        replace(settings, admin_password="rotated password"),
+        issued.value,
+        now=1_700_000_001,
+    ) is None
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        replace(settings, admin_id="rotated-admin"),
+        issued.value,
+        now=1_700_000_001,
+    ) is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "payload",
+    [
+        {},
+        {"v": 2, "sub": ADMIN_ID, "iat": 1, "exp": 2, "jti": "x"},
+        {"v": 1, "sub": "", "iat": 1, "exp": 2, "jti": "x"},
+        {"v": 1, "sub": ADMIN_ID, "iat": "1", "exp": 2, "jti": "x"},
+        {"v": 1, "sub": ADMIN_ID, "iat": 2, "exp": 2, "jti": "x"},
+        {"v": 1, "sub": ADMIN_ID, "iat": 1, "exp": 2, "jti": ""},
+        {"v": 1, "sub": ADMIN_ID, "iat": 1, "exp": 2, "jti": "x", "extra": 1},
+    ],
+)
+def test_claim_schema_is_strict(payload: dict[str, object]) -> None:
+    token = authentication._serializer_for(_settings()).dumps(payload)
+
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        _settings(), token, now=1
+    ) is None
+
+
+def test_oversized_and_malformed_tokens_are_rejected() -> None:
+    settings = _settings()
+
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(settings, "x" * 10_000, now=1) is None
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(settings, "not-a-token", now=1) is None
+
+
+def test_payload_does_not_encode_secrets() -> None:
+    settings = replace(_settings(), admin_id="configured-admin-identity")
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings,
+        remember_me=False,
+        now=1_700_000_000,
+        token_id="fixed-token-id",
+    )
+    payload = authentication._serializer_for(settings).loads(issued.value)
+
+    assert set(payload) == {"v", "sub", "iat", "exp", "jti"}
+    assert "password" not in json.dumps(payload).lower()
+    assert "secret" not in json.dumps(payload).lower()
+    assert settings.admin_id not in json.dumps(payload)
+
+
+def test_remember_me_token_expires_at_exact_30_day_boundary() -> None:
+    settings = _settings()
+    issued = authentication.issue_persistent_token(
+        settings, remember_me=True, now=1_700_000_000, token_id="boundary-token-id"
+    )
+
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        settings, issued.value, now=issued.expires_at - 1
+    ) is not None
+    assert authentication.verify_persistent_token(
+        settings, issued.value, now=issued.expires_at
+    ) is None
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ wheels = [

 [[package]]
 name = "jarca-ledger-mcp"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.3"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
    { name = "mcp" },
@@ -481,27 +481,35 @@ dependencies = [

 [package.optional-dependencies]
 dashboard = [
+    { name = "itsdangerous" },
    { name = "pandas" },
    { name = "plotly" },
+    { name = "starlette" },
    { name = "streamlit" },
+    { name = "uvicorn" },
 ]
 dev = [
    { name = "pytest" },
    { name = "ruff" },
+    { name = "websockets" },
 ]

 [package.metadata]
 requires-dist = [
+    { name = "itsdangerous", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=2.2.0,<3.0" },
    { name = "mcp", specifier = ">=1.0.0" },
    { name = "msoffcrypto-tool", specifier = ">=5.4.0" },
    { name = "openpyxl", specifier = ">=3.1.0" },
-    { name = "pandas", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=2.0.0" },
-    { name = "plotly", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=5.0.0" },
+    { name = "pandas", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=2.2.0" },
+    { name = "plotly", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=5.20.0" },
    { name = "pymupdf", specifier = ">=1.24.0" },
    { name = "pytest", marker = "extra == 'dev'", specifier = ">=8.0.0" },
    { name = "python-dotenv", specifier = ">=1.0.0" },
    { name = "ruff", marker = "extra == 'dev'", specifier = ">=0.6.0" },
-    { name = "streamlit", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=1.30.0" },
+    { name = "starlette", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=0.40.0,<2.0" },
+    { name = "streamlit", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=1.58.0,<1.59.0" },
+    { name = "uvicorn", marker = "extra == 'dashboard'", specifier = ">=0.30.0,<1.0" },
+    { name = "websockets", marker = "extra == 'dev'", specifier = ">=15.0,<17.0" },
 ]
 provides-extras = ["dev", "dashboard"]
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
gitea-release-agent	ffd943fe65	chore(release): prepare v0.1.3 Merge the independently reviewed v0.1.3 release preparation.	2026-10-04 07:34:51 +00:00
genichin	28527a0914	[verified] chore(release): prepare v0.1.3	2026-10-04 16:32:23 +09:00
genichin	6fe2594c09	Merge pull request 'feat(dashboard): persist administrator login' (#7 ) from gitea-agent/issue-6-dashboard-persistent-auth into main Reviewed-on: jsfamily/jarca-ledger-mcp#7 Reviewed-by: gitea-spec-agent <gitea-spec-agent@mail.jsfamily.quest> Reviewed-by: gitea-review-agent <gitea-review-agent@mail.jsfamily.quest>	2026-10-04 07:13:11 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	6a35775cca	[verified] docs(evidence): record F-003 verification	2026-10-04 03:56:53 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	d84ed8ff2a	[verified] fix(auth): support Unicode credentials	2026-10-04 03:53:47 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	755c26865c	docs(auth): preserve login runtime evidence	2026-10-03 00:17:44 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	e7242a89f7	fix(auth): bound asynchronous login handling	2026-10-02 12:28:52 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	3311866431	docs(auth): restore successful login contract	2026-10-02 07:35:01 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	8544ea30f4	docs(auth): restore legacy acceptance contracts	2026-10-02 06:09:11 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	7056e012a7	docs(auth): complete persistent token contracts	2026-10-02 04:48:06 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	9bc64699cb	docs(evidence): bind persistent auth browser run	2026-10-02 03:04:24 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	7bb959859a	fix(dashboard): address persistent auth review	2026-10-02 03:02:23 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	91e106d75c	docs(requirements): link persistent auth PR	2026-10-01 13:58:32 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	c5eaddb4f3	feat(dashboard): persist administrator login	2026-10-01 13:56:22 +00:00
gitea-release-agent	7bea8b368e	feat(deploy): run v0.1.2 as non-root Merge the independently reviewed non-root image and hardened k3s deployment contract.	2026-09-30 11:44:59 +00:00
genichin	ee3e3852ee	[verified] feat(deploy): run v0.1.2 as non-root	2026-09-30 20:41:56 +09:00
gitea-release-agent	bf746e0cf3	chore(release): reconcile v0.1.1 with main Integrate the verified v0.1.1 release history before v0.1.2 preparation.	2026-09-30 08:06:38 +00:00
genichin	7a120bb068	chore(release): prepare v0.1.1	2026-09-30 16:03:30 +09:00
genichin	18384c0e0b	Merge pull request 'feat(dashboard): add administrator authentication' (#3 ) from gitea-impl-agent/jarca-ledger-mcp:gitea-agent/issue-1-dashboard-admin-auth into main Reviewed-on: genichin/jarca-ledger-mcp#3 Reviewed-by: gitea-spec-agent <gitea-spec-agent@mail.jsfamily.quest>	2026-09-28 06:51:10 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	3e0da954be	docs(requirements): link dashboard authentication PR	2026-09-25 14:44:23 +00:00
gitea-impl-agent	7c2a6bdcd3	feat(dashboard): add administrator authentication	2026-09-25 14:40:19 +00:00